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REASONABLE CERTAINTY AND 
REASONABLE DOUBT 
HENRY L. CHAMBERS, JR.* 
"I come from a state that raises com and cotton and cockleburs and 
Democrats, and frothy eloquence neither convinces nor satisfies me. I 
am from Missouri. You have got to show me."-8en. Willard Duncan 
Vandiver 1 
"Skepticism is my only gospel, but I don't want to make a dogma 
out of it. "-Learned Hand 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the quotes that open this article suggest, skepticism is good, but 
dogmatic skepticism may not be. Skepticism helps us discover truth; 
excessive skepticism may obscure truth.3 Finding the amount of skepti-
cism that illuminates the truth without hiding it should be a goal of any 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law; B.A., 
J.D., University of Virginia. The author wishes to thank the University of Missouri Law 
School Foundation, which provided support for this Article throughout its preparation. In 
addition, the author thanks all of the friends and colleagues with whom he has discussed 
various aspects of this Article, particularly Dean Timothy Heinsz, and Professors Edward 
Pallone, David Fischer, Wilson Freyermuth, Edward Hunvald, Evan Lee, Andrew Leipold, 
Michael Middleton, Robert P. Mosteller, Philip Peters, and Joseph Stulberg. Special thanks 
also go to my wife, Paula, and the rest of my family. 
1. STATE OF MISSOURI, OFFICIAL MANUAL, 1961-1962 1486 (quoting the Senator's 
1899 speech). 
2. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Foreword to GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE 
MAN AND THE JUDGE at xii (1994). 
3. For the purposes of this article, skepticism refers to a refusal to believe or a reason to 
doubt. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 2353 (2nd ed. 
1952) (defining skepticism as "[a]n incredulous or doubting state of mind ... ");RANDOM 
HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1232 (1st ed. 1988) (defining skeptic as "a person who ques-
tions the validity or authenticity of something purporting to be factual"). 
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system that seeks truth. These ideas apply with special force to the 
criminal justice system. 
The goals of the criminal justice system are simple: find the truth, 
convict the guilty and acquit the innocent.4 In order to help guarantee 
that those goals are met, the system employs skepticism by requiring 
that each juror presume a defendant's innocence until that defendant's 
guilt is proven and requiring that each juror be convinced beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant is guilty before a defendant is con-
victed. In combination, these requirements ensure that jurors are ini-
tially skeptical of a defendant's guilt and that their skepticism is 
overcome before that defendant is convicted. Mandating skepticism 
helps to ensure that guilty verdicts are based on proof of guilt rather 
than conjecture regarding defendant's guilt and leads society to trust in 
a criminal justice system calculated both to find truth and, necessarily, 
to imprison innocent defendants very rarely, if at all.5 
Applying some level of skepticism in a criminal trial is necessary; 
deciding what level should be applied is crucial. The appropriate level 
of skepticism to be applied in the criminal justice system depends on the 
results society wants from the system. How reasonable doubt and the 
presumption of innocence are defined and applied can result in jurors 
applying too high a level or too low a level of skepticism.6 An over-
abundance of skepticism may lead jurors to require evidence stronger 
than necessary for conviction, lessen the likelihood that a juror will be 
4. Of course, these goals are utopian. Our imperfect ability to identify the innocent and 
guilty correctly leads to rules that determine what to do when we are unable to identify guilt 
with certainty. That juries will be uncertain in some cases and that such uncertainty should 
redound to the defendant's benefit guarantees that only the clearly guilty will be imprisoned. 
See Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 980-81(1993) 
(recognizing that a jury's fallibility causes the justice system to allocate error such that some 
number of guilty defendants will be acquitted to make sure that few innocent defendants are 
convicted). The criminal justice system's best hope is to find the probable truth, convict the 
clearly guilty and acquit the possibly innocent. 
5. That society trust jury verdicts is essential. See Adrian A. S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact or 
Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487, 496 (1986) ("Juries are suited to be put in charge of adjudi-
cating on the merits because of the trust they command in the community. Since the efficacy 
of any judicial system depends on its ability to generate public confidence in its judgments, 
the element of trust in the tribunal is crucial."); Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and 
Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1225 (1979) 
(arguing that confidence in criminal adjudication is necessary for society to feel that injustice 
has not been done) [hereinafter Permissive Inferences]. 
6. Whether the level of skepticism set is too high or too low depends on precisely what 
the realistic goals of the criminal justice system are. The appropriate level of skepticism in a 
system that seeks to convict the probably guilty is different than the appropriate level of 
skepticism in a system that seeks to convict only the certainly guilty. 
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convinced of a defendant's guilt, and lead to verdicts that do not com-
port with society's vision of justice.7 Such an overabundance can flow 
from a strict application of the reasonable doubt standard and the pre-
sumption of innocence, can lead jurors to be extraordinarily difficult to 
convince of guilt and set a standard of proof for conviction that would 
result in very few convictions. That could wreak havoc on a system that 
must imprison some reasonable or substantial number of guilty defen-
dants to remain viable.8 
Conversely, a somewhat relaxed definition of the reasonable doubt 
standard and the presumption of innocence may lead to the application 
of a somewhat lower level of skepticism in the system. Such a level of 
skepticism may allow juries to identify correctly a reasonable number of 
guilty defendants, but may allow a higher number of innocent defen-
dants to be convicted than under a higher level of skepticism.9 Therein 
lies the trade-off. A strict (or perhaps overly strict) application of the 
reasonable doubt standard may yield few convictions, but almost guar-
antee that convicted defendants are guilty. A more relaxed application 
may yield more convictions of guilty defendants but allow the convic-
tion of additional innocent defendants. Even though proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence are required under 
the criminal justice system, how they are applied may lead to results 
that conflict with the goals of the justice system. 
Ultimately, this article is about how well different definitions of rea-
sonable doubt fit society's goals for the criminal justice system. To be 
clear, this article is not about which definition is best. That question is 
far broader than the one I seek to explore. Determining what definition 
of reasonable doubt is best for the system is a question for another time. 
7. While the fact that a defendant appears clearly guilty to society does not mean that 
he is, society will craft its rules to catch a reasonable number of defendants. See George C. 
Thomas ill & Barry S. Pollack, Rethinking Guilt, Juries, and Jeopardy, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
8-9 (1992) (suggesting that society's opinion regarding guilt is important to a well-functioning 
justice system). 
8. At some point, the risk of acquitting too many guilty defendants will outweigh the 
risk of imprisoning an innocent defendant. See Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule 
and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS LJ. 457, 460 (1989) ("The level at which the 
presumption of innocence [and reasonable doubt] is set reflects society's weighing of ... two 
injustices-acquitting the guilty and convicting the innocent-and at some poil,.lt the cost of 
the presumption of innocence would be too great."). 
9. This article should not be taken to suggest that significant numbers of innocent de-
fendants are currently being convicted. Rather, this article notes the distinct likelihood that 
some number of defendants are being incarcerated without being proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt as strictly defined. Whether these defendants are innocent depends on 
how often the possibility of innocence reflects the reality of innocence. 
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Rather, this article describes a few different ways that reasonable doubt 
and the presumption of innocence can be interpreted and considers the 
implications of applying those differing interpretations. Part II of this 
article examines how the criminal justice system employs skepticism to 
determine guilt accurately. Part III explains how strict and relaxed ap-
plications of the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of in-
nocence impacts jury verdicts. Part IV suggests that we adopt a mean-
ing for reasonable doubt that matches society's goals for the justice 
system. The criminal justice system uses skepticism in the form of rea-
sonable doubt and the presumption of innocence to determine who is 
imprisoned. The question remains: Could the system allow jurors to 
use the wrong amount of skepticism? 
II. DOUBT, SKEPTICISM, AND CERTAINTY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
Criminal trials are one-sided searches for the truth that answer one 
question: Is the defendant certainly guilty?10 If the answer is yes, the de-
fendant is convicted; if the answer is probably yes, possibly yes, possibly 
no or anything other than an unequivocal yes, the defendant is acquit-
ted. If the system could perfectly discriminate between the guilty and 
innocent, only guilty defendants would be convicted, and only innocent 
defendants would be acquitted. In a perfect world, every verdict would 
accurately reflect the truth, that is, whether the defendant actually 
committed the crime charge. However, because the criminal justice sys-
tem, like all systems that depend on human judgment, is not perfect, er-
rors will occur in the criminal justice system, and society must deter-
mine how to manage such errors.11 Consequently, the question that is 
ultimately asked in a criminal trial is not merely whether the defendant 
is guilty, but rather, whether the defendant is certainly guilty. 
The criminal justice system uses skepticism, in the form of the rea-
10. See Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptua/ization of Civil Trials, 66 B.D. L. REv. 401,436 
(1986) ("The objective of a criminal trial is not to choose among the stories of the parties. 
Rather, it is to determine whether or not the only plausible explanation of the event in ques-
tion is that the defendant is guilty as charged."). Indeed, the focus is so much on defendant's 
guilt that other serious issues may become obscured. See William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of 
Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REv. 329,376 (1995) (suggesting that trials can become so focused 
on guilt that "an accused's factual innocence may never be at issue"). 
11. The errors referenced are not procedural errors or clear errors in evidentiary 
evaluation that can be easily corrected on appeal. Rather, they refer to those that occur even 
when a trial is fair. These errors occur because even in cases where the evidence points un-
doubtedly to guilt, a defendant may be innocent, and even in cases where the evidence points 
undoubtedly to reasonable doubt or innocence, a defendant may have committed the crime. 
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sonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence, to determine 
whether a defendant is certainly guilty. If the prosecution overcomes 
the presumption of innocence12 and proves a defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, 13 the prosecution will have proven that the defendant 
is certainly guilty to society's satisfaction. These rules help ensure that 
guilty verdicts accurately reflect the truth, i.e., defendant's actual guilt, 
by employing skepticism to test prosecution cases. The results of using 
the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence to test 
the prosecution's claim of guilt are two-fold. First, ostensibly, only 
guilty defendants are convicted. Second, some number of defendants 
are acquitted, not because they are innocent, but because the prosecu-
tion could not prove they are guilty. This result is not accidental. 
Rather, it is consistent with a societal preference of the acquittal of 
guilty14 defendants over the conviction of innocent defendants.15 
In the criminal justice system, possible error is allocated in favor of 
the defendant. The defendant receives the benefit of all reasonable 
doubts and is acquitted whenever the possibility of his innocence re-
mains after trial. That allocation is the result of asking whether a de-
fendant is certainly guilty and only allowing proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt to serve as proof of certain guilt. The reasonable doubt standard 
and the presumption of innocence are the system's attempt to eliminate 
erroneous convictions by requiring that jurors be very certain of a de-
fendant's guilt before convicting him. However, at least two inter-
12 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 {1993) ("A person when flrst charged with 
a crime is entitled to a presumption of innocence, and may insist that his guilt be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt."); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 {1976) ("The presump-
tion of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair 
trial under our system of criminal justice."). 
13. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) ("Expressions in many opinions of this 
Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is constitutionally required."); Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury 
Instruction: Giving Meaning to a Critical Concept, 22 AM. J. CR!M. L. 677, 678 {1995) 
{"Today it is well established that trial courts must instruct juries that they may convict only 
if convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."). Cf. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 
508 U.S. 275, 277-82 {1993){confuming that defective reasonable doubt instruction is not 
subject to harmless error review); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 n. 14 {1979) 
("[F]ailure to instruct a jury on the necessity of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt can 
never be harmless error."). 
14. In this context, guilty means that the defendant actually committed the crime, not 
that the jury acquitted a defendant it knew had been proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
15. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 358 
("[F]or the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent 
suffer."). This notion continues in our Anglo-American justice system. 
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twined questions remain: How certain of a defendant's guilt does a jury 
need to be to imprison another citizen and how does one determine that 
one is certain that a defendant is guilty? 
A. Absolute Certainty 
If a criminal trial could determine truth absolutely, it would be the 
perfect vehicle for determining guilt and innocence. Unfortunately, ab-
solute or mathematical certainty is unattainable in the context of a 
criminal trial because such certainty is demonstrated through strict logi-
cal proof.16 Such a level of proof is not attainable given the nature of 
trial evidence.17 All trial evidence that bears directly on guilt is fallible.18 
Consequently, conclusions drawn from that evidence are fallible. This 
is a limitation of evidence, not a limitation of jurors or the justice sys-
tem. While a juror (or non-juror) might be willing to say, and may be-
lieve, that he is absolutely certain that a defendant is guilty, he cannot 
be in the mathematical sense. 
A criminal justice system requiring absolute certainty for conviction 
would be ineffectual. Guilty verdicts would require that a juror believe 
that absolutely no possibility of innocence existed.19 Such belief would 
16. See Barbara J. Shapiro, "To A Moral Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-
American Juries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 153, 192-93 (1986) ("[T]here are two realms of 
human knowledge. In one it is possible to obtain the absolute certainty of mathematical 
demonstration ... In the other, which is the empirical realm of events, absolute certainty of 
this kind is not possible .... The highest level of certainty in this realm in which no absolute 
certainty is possible is what traditionally has been called moral certainty."); Steven J. Burton, 
Judge Posner's Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 87 MICH. L. REv. 710 (1988) (arguing that one 
should not mix scientific discourse's quest for certainty with legal discourse's search for 
truth); Colin Moran, Cardinal Newman and Jury Verdicts: Reason, Belief, and Certitude, 8 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 63, 73 (1996) ("Seventeenth-century thought distinguished between 
knowledge and probability. One could have 'absolute certainty' of a conclusion if it could be 
empirically verified, or proven like a geometric theorem."). 
17. Of course, scientists may argue that the legal system can barely claim to be able to 
find even practical truth. See, e.g., Carl Sagan, Crop Circles and Aliens: Whafs The Evi-
dence, PARADE, Dec. 3, 1995, at 10 ("In college, in the early 1950s, I began to learn a little 
about how science works-the secrets of its great success: how rigorous the standards of evi-
dence must be if we are really to know something is true; how many false starts and dead 
ends have plagued human thinking; how our biases can color our interpretation of the evi-
dence; how belief systems widely held and supported by the political, religious and academic 
hierarchies often turn out to be not just slightly in error but grotesquely wrong."). 
18. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 158 (Moral certainty is "based on testimony and sec-
ondhand reports of sense data."); Moran, supra note 16, at 73 ("Propositions which could not 
be verified through sensory observation or logically proved would be affirmed or rejected on 
the basis of probabilistic judgments. About this kind of proposition, one could have 'moral 
certainty' but not 'absolute certainty."'). 
19. Interestingly, historically, juries were told that they needed to be convinced to near-
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likely require a juror's faith in defendant's guilt, a juror's actual knowl-
edge of the crime, a juror's complete trust in an eyewitness's testimony 
or a juror's refusal to apply the absolute certainty standard.20 Faith 
seems an insufficient and fleeting basis for a verdict that is to be 
grounded in reason.21 People with actual knowledge of the crime or its 
perpetrator are witnesses incapable of serving on the subject jury.22 
Eyewitness testimony is very often susceptible to possible doubt,23 as 
absolute certainty to convict. See Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development 
of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507,511 (1975) (suggesting that the burden of 
persuasion prior to the widespread adoption of the reasonable doubt rule "closely approxi-
mated absolute certainty-jurors were to acquit if they had any doubts."). 
20. Of course, it may seem odd to suggest that a jury could misapply a standard of proof 
in a hypothetical criminal justice system. However, misapplication might best explain a 
guilty verdict in a hypothetical system requiring absolute certainty. If the hypothetical sys-
tem allows guilty verdicts based on evidence that is not sufficiently powerful to meet the 
prosecution's burden of proof, a jury must act improperly when it convicts based on evidence 
that is as strong as it can possibly be, but is still not strong enough to reach the required stan-
dard of proof. See generally Part ill. 
21. Basing guilt or innocence on faith or religious belief is inappropriate if it results in 
discounting evidence that the juror believes. But see STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE 
OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 
67 (1993) ("The trutil-an awkward one for the guardians of the public square-is that tens 
of millions of Americans rely on their religious traditions for tile moral knowledge that tells 
them how to conduct their lives, including their political lives."). Consider whether signals 
from a divine being directing that the juror reach a particular verdict would be sufficiently 
reasonable for American society to imprison or release a defendant. Arguably, a verdict 
based on faith is not based on reason. See Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. LJ. 
453, 456 (1996) ("The lasting accomplishment of the Enlightenment, then, was its develop-
ment of an epistemological method .... Personal revelation and institutional power were no 
longer valid sources of authority. Instead, the human capacity to reason, in all its splendor, 
would control the future."); CARTER, supra note 21, at 217 ("[I]n tile world of post-
Enlightenment liberalism, science deals with knowledge about the natural world, whereas 
religion is simply a system of belief, based on faitil."). Nonetileless, the verdict may be rea-
sonable (or at least acceptable) either because the process of letting a higher being decide a 
case is reasonable or because society authorizes jurors to decide cases by reference to divine 
beings. 
22. In the past, jurors were people who may have known the basics about the charged 
crime before impaneled. See Peter G. Keane, The Jury-Some Thoughts, Historical and Per-
sona~ 47 HASTINGS LJ. 1249, 1251 (1996) ("The early jury bore little resemblance to the 
protected and carefully insulated creature which we know today. Jurors were a group of 
neighbors who came togetiler and pooled their collective knowledge about a dispute to reach 
an agreement on the proper resolution. How ironic that over centuries the modern jury 
evolved into its present form. Today, if a potential juror has any personal information about 
the case, it is a complete bar to that person serving."); Morano, supra note 19, at 509 (Jurors 
"could have either witnessed the event personally or undertaken an independent investiga-
tion as means of gathering the evidence necessary to decide the issues presented to them."). 
23. See C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICI'ED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CON-
VICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 69 (1996) (suggesting that in many circumstances eyewitness 
testimony is unreliable). 
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eyewitness testimony reflects what the witness believes she saw rather 
than what undoubtedly occurred.24 
Absolute certainty entails the elimination of all theoretical doubt 
and allows no uncertainty.25 While the elimination of all theoretical 
doubt, as would be required under a system requiring absolute cer-
tainty, would guarantee that only guilty defendants would be convicted, 
such would also make convictions nearly impossible to obtain.26 An ab-
solute certainty requirement would demand an inappropriately high 
level of proof given the limitations of trial evidence, would put too 
heavy a burden on any justice system that sought to punish any reason-
able number of guilty defendants, and would be unacceptable in prac-
tice.27 Not surprisingly, absolute certainty is not the standard that our 
justice system uses. Instead, the American criminal justice system at-
tempts to use practical certainty, in the form of reasonable doubt, to de-
termine when a defendant should be imprisoned. 
B. Practical Certainty and Reasonable Doubt 
As requiring absolute certainty before conviction is not viable in our 
criminal justice system, the system instead requires moral certainty or 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt before conviction.28 Moral or practi-
cal cert~tf9 is the highest level of certainty an individual can have in 
24. Of course, some reasonable amount of trust in a witness's testimony can lead to a 
jury's belief beyond a reasonable doubt loosely defined. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 177 
("Verdicts would necessarily be devoid of absolute certainty or demonstration, but trials, at 
least those with appropriately credible witnesses, might proceed to verdicts which the jury 
had no reason to doubt."). If a mother were an eyewitness to her son's armed robbery, there 
would be no reason to doubt the accuracy of her identification or conversely, no reason to 
believe that she was mistaken. 
25. See Paul C. Smith, Note, The Process of Reasonable Doubt: A Proposed Instruction 
in Response to Victor v. Nebraska, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1811, 1832 (1995) ("In all human mat-
ters there exists what has been described as 'free-floating existential doubt.' Standing alone, 
this ever-present doubt cannot reasonably dissuade a juror's belief, and therefore it should 
not preclude conviction."). 
26. See HUFF, supra note 23, at 144 ("It is not within the realm of possibility to prevent 
all wrongful convictions. A system of law that never caught an innocent person in its web 
would probably be so ineffectual that it would catch few of the guilty as well."). 
27. See Sundby, supra note 8. 
28. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required for a defendant to be 
legally convicted. See supra note 13. 
29. In this article, moral and practical certainty will be used interchangeably because 
the slight differences that some find between them do not matter for the purposes of this ar-
ticle. For various explanations of moral certainty or practical certainty or both see BARBARA 
J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE 1-41 (1991); Peter Till-
ers, Intellectual History, Probability, and the Law of Evidence, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1465 
(reviewing Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause); Steven L. Smith, Skepticism, 
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the absence of absolute certaint)f0 and has been equated with proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt.31 Practical certainty requires that jurors be as 
sure as possible of a defendant's guilt before convicting him and is given 
effect through the reasonable doubt standard. While practical certainty 
is a lower standard than absolute certainty, it is still a very high stan-
dard. Because it is a high standard, it helps the system avoid convicting 
the innocent. Conversely, practical certainty is a low enough standard 
to allow the conviction of the guilty. However, a closer look at practical 
certainty and reasonable doubt is necessary to determine how they 
serve these purposes. 
A criminal trial focuses on the single proposition that a defendant is 
guilty.32 A juror can have at least three positions with respect to that 
proposition. A juror can be certain of the proposition's falsity, uncer-
tain of its falsity (or truth) or certain of its truth. If a juror is certain 
that a defendant is not guilty, the content of the reasonable doubt stan-
dard does not matter because the juror must acquit. Similarly, if the ju-
ror knows that she is uncertain about whether the defendant committed 
the crime, she must acquit. However, where the line is between being 
certain that the defendant committed the crime and being uncertain 
that the defendant committed the crime is crucial to the justice system 
because that line separates a guilty vote from a not guilty vote. How-
ever, that line may not be nearly as crucial, in a juror's mind, as the line 
that separates belief from disbelief. The line between guilt and inno-
cence and the line between belief and disbelief are drawn in different 
places. A juror may believe that the defendant committed the crime yet 
be uncertain that he did and, consequently, have to vote for acquittal. 
Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expression, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 651 (1987); Mo-
ran, supra note 16, generally. For the purposes of this article, practical certainty and moral 
certainty will be defined as the highest level of proof attainable in the absence of absolute 
certainty. 
30. Reasonabl~ doubt is the highest practical standard of proof that exists. See Moran, 
supra note 16, at 76-77 ("In Adrian A.S. Zuckerman's view, the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' 
standard is 'the highest attainable standard for the proof of guilt.' By 'highest attainable,' 
Zuckerman means not. the highest assurance which can be attained without witnessing the 
crime, but the highest assurance of which the mind is capable, whether a person has seen the 
crime firsthand or not. 'The highest attainable standard,' he writes, 'is one that so approxi-
mates to certainty as to make no difference.' One has to admit the 'theoretical possibility' of 
error, but insofar as a juror's evaluation of the evidence is concerned, this possibility is 
'imperceptible.' Every juror who properly votes for a guilty verdict feels as certain of the 
defendant's guilt as if she witnessed the accused perform the crime firsthand.'') (quoting 
ADRIAN A.S. ZUCKERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 135 (1989)). 
31. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 11 (1994); Morano, supra note 19, at 513 
(equating moral certainty and lack of reasonable doubt). 
32 See supra note 10. 
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The relationship and difference between belief in a defendant's guilt 
and certainty of a defendant's guilt is important. 
A juror who is certain that a defendant committed a crime must be-
lieve that the defendant committed the crime. However, a juror may 
believe that a defendant committed a crime while being uncertain that 
he committed the crime. While acting based on belief may be appropri-
ate in many situations, convicting a defendant can only occur based on 
certainty. More importantly, a conviction must be based on justified 
certainty. Belief may appear to be certainty when it is not. While a 
person can believe he is certain of truth, if that certainty rests on insuf-
ficient proof, the certainty is unjustified. In such a situation, the cer-
tainty is mere belief or trust.33 Although evidence may support a belief 
and the belief may ultimately be proven true, mere belief does not re-
quire evidence sufficient to reach justified certainty.34 Both belief and 
justified certainty suggest that the subject individual finds the subject 
proposition likely true. However, belief can entail lingering doubt and 
the legitimate possibility that conflicting propositions may be true; cer-
tainty cannot.35 
33. Possibly, the certainty that the perceiver embraces is little more than a hunch. See 
Moran, supra note 16, at 68-69 ("[A] practiced eye may note the faces of two people thirty 
years apart in age and, without more information, discern that they are members of the same 
family. If asked, the observer might not be able to articulate the common characteristics 
which gave rise to the inference of familial relationship."). What is left is whether words are 
inadequate to explain the relationship between the evidence and the conclusion or whether 
the perceiver is unable to find the words to express the relationship. Of course, the fact of 
familial relationship can be easily verified. Arguably, the level of certainty held by the per-
ceiver matters little because the accuracy of the perception can be tested. A more funda-
mental question is whether the subjective certainty should be trusted in a matter not suscep-
tible to accurate testing. See id. at 88-89 ("(W]e would not be reasonable to continue trusting 
a person's ability to see family resemblances if the person repeatedly proved incorrect. 
When a person cannot articulate a reason for his conclusion, placing confidence in his con-
clusion is not necessarily reasonable. The reasonableness of the confidence does depend 
upon evidence, even if the evidence is demonstrably reliable judgment rather than articu-
lated reasons."). 
34. See Joseph Raz, Liberalism, Skepticism, and Democracy, 74 IOWA L. REV. 761, 764 
(1989) ("Justified certainty rests not on a belief in infallibility, but on a belief that one is not 
in fact mistaken, that there is no reason to suspect a mistake, and every reason, based on evi-
dence and on one's situation, to trust one's beliefs."). See also Moran, supra note 16, at 63-64 
("Judicial finders of fact also reach definite conclusions on the basis of incomplete proof. 
Every juror at a criminal trial, like every religious inquirer, must decide on a proposition 
without verifying the conclusion empirically or proving it through explicit logic ... [T]he ju-
ror [is] forced to reason by probability, which implies qualification and reservation."). 
35. Nonetheless, certainty does afford the theoretical possibility of fallibility. See Leslie 
Pickering Francis, Law and Philosophy: From Skepticism to Value Theory, 27 LOY. L.A. L. 
REv. 65, 71 (1993) ("Knowledge is not dogmatic certainty. It is a process of achieving justi-
fied belief, belief that can best withstand criticism at a given time, yet is always open to reex-
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Reasonable doubt is doubt based on uncertainty.36 Jurors may not 
convict a defendant if they have a reasonable doubt about any element 
of the crime charged.37 Though many definitions of reasonable doubt 
exist, giving precise content to reasonable doubt is difficult.38 Defining 
reasonable doubt is easy;39 defining what makes a particular doubt rea-
sonable is not. Although reasonable doubt instructions command that 
the jury be as certain as possible that defendant is guilty before con-
victing him, even the most well-versed in the justice system have diffi-
culty capturing the essence of reasonable doubt.40 
Reasonable doubt is a justifiably high standard for conviction.41 
More important decisions require greater certainty before action than 
less important decisions. Being wrong is of greater consequence when 
the decision being made is of greater consequence.42 Our justice system 
amination."); Raz, supra note 34, at 764 ("The point is that uncertainty is an awareness of a 
flaw ... , inadequate evidence, or an inferior situation one is in . . . . Mere realization of fal-
libility is not a discovery of a flaw, but an awareness of the conditions of knowledge."). 
36. A reasonable doubt has been defined as, among other things, a doubt that would 
cause a reasonable person to hesitate before acting in matters of serious importance. See 
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (upholding jury instruction that defined a reasonable 
doubt as "such a doubt as would cause a reasonable and prudent person, in one of the graver 
and more important transactions of life, to pause and hesitate before taking the represented 
facts as true and relying and acting thereon"); BLACK'S LAW DICI'IONARY 1138 (5th ed. 
1979) {defining reasonable doubt as, inter alia, "doubt based on reason and arising from evi-
dence or lack of evidence, and it is doubt which reasonable man or woman might entertain, 
and it is not fanciful doubt, is not imagined doubt, and is not doubt that juror might conjure 
up to avoid performing an unpleasant task or duty"). 
37. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 276 (1993); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 
69 (1991). 
38. The precise content of the reasonable doubt standard is unclear. Many varied in-
structions have been deemed sufficient to convey the essence of reasonable doubt. See gen-
erally, Victor, 511 U.S. at 1 (upholding jury instructions in principal case and a related case, 
Sandoval v. California); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Holland v. United States, 
348 U.S. 121 {1954); Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 92 (1907); Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 
430, 441 (1887). 
39. The concept is so easy to explain that some courts do not allow its explanation. See 
Jessica Cohen, supra note 13, at 685 (explaining that in United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42 
{4th Cir. 1994), the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals forbade its courts to define reasonable 
doubt). 
40. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 ("Although [the reasonable doubt] standard ... is an an-
cient and honored aspect of our crilninal justice system, it defies easy explication."); Harry 
A. Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not To Define, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
1716, 1722 (1990) ("Judges, with all their legal knowledge and experience, sometimes have 
difficulty construing the meaning of reasonable doubt."). 
41. Cf. Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Unanimous Verdict: Politics and the Jury Trial, 1977 
WASH. U. L.Q. 39, 51 ("Truth, as the philosophers tell us, is the highest and most difficult 
standard upon which to base one's actions."). 
42. This is not to suggest that decisional paralysis generally results from uncertainty. 
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explicitly recognizes this by requiring differing levels of proof in crimi-
nal and civil trials.43 In a criminal trial, a guilty verdict restricts a citi-
zen's life or liberty. That is arguably the most important decision citi-
zens make regarding one another.44 The importance of that decision 
and the certainty that must accompany it drives the level of certainty 
required before action is taken on the basis of that decision. Conse-
quently, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required before a court 
may impose a criminal sanction. In civil actions, where often only the 
redistribution of money occurs, a preponderance of the evidence, or 
"more likely than not" standard, is required before a court may impose 
liability.45 The relative importance that society places on the conse-
quences of civil and criminal verdicts is reflected in how certain a jury 
must be before it can sanction a criminal or civil defendant.46 
The justice system requires a high level of certainty of guilt before 
conviction. Reaching moral or practical certainty requires the elimina-
tion of uncertainty and doubt. Skepticism is uncertainty and is the re-
fusal to believe insufficiently proven facts or conclusions.47 Essentially, 
skepticism is doubt. At a criminal trial, skepticism manifests itself as 
the refusal to believe particular pieces of evidence and, ultimately, can 
mean a refusal to believe defendant's guilt. As the backdrop against 
which individuals and society determine and act on truth, skepticism is 
important for reasoned analysis and is indispensable for anyone 
searching for truth. 48 
Rather, one has a greater need of certainty the more important a decision is. 
43. See generally, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 {1979). 
44. See Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persua-
sion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1339 (1977) ("Because the criminal sanction is an 
especially serious matter for both the defendant and the community, it is especially impor-
tant to ensure that it is imposed only on a defendant who has forfeited his right to be free 
from punishment."); Jacobsohn, supra note 41, at 54 (arguing that a jury's legitimacy rests on 
the belief that its process was consistent with the gravity of the decision made). 
45. See generally, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). 
46. However, great legal minds have been skeptical regarding the usefulness of differ-
entiating among burdens of proof. See Underwood, supra note 44, at 1309 (explaining Judge 
Learned Hand's reluctance to differentiate the preponderance of the evidence standard and 
the reasonable doubt standard). Nonetheless, other judges have been able to distinguish be-
tween various standards of proof. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 367 ("Finally, we reject the Court 
of Appeals' suggestion that there is, in any event, only a 'tenuous difference' between the 
reasonable-doubt and preponderance standards. The suggestion is singularly unpersuasive. 
In this very case, the trial judge's ability to distinguish between the two standards enabled 
him to make a finding of guilt that he conceded he might not have made under the standard 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
47. See supra note 3. 
48. Arguably, skepticism is an important trait even for those not engaged in a search for 
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Justified certainty and reasonable doubt are roughly equivalent be-
cause both require the elimination of lingering doubts in the mind of 
the believer regarding the truth of a proposition. One who is justifiably 
certain of the truth of a proposition is not skeptical of the same proposi-
tion. An individual may be convinced that a proposition is true, but 
cannot be justifiably certain of its truth unless he was uncertain of its 
truth at some point in the past.49 The person need not have disbelieved 
the subject proposition. Rather, he must have been unconvinced that 
the proposition was true. Strength of evidence moves that individual 
from a state of uncertainty to a state of justified certainty. Whether a 
person is certain of the truth of a particular proposition may depend, in 
part, on how skeptical that individual was of the proposition when first 
posited.50 If a person is relatively sure of the truth of the proposition 
when initially stated, little evidence may be necessary to convince that 
individual of the truth of the proposition. 51 • 
Evidence convinces jurors, creates justified certainty, drives the trial 
process, and determines verdicts.52 However, neither evidence nor justi-
fied certainty foreclose the possibility of error. That a jury is convinced 
of defendant's guilt after a trial does not guarantee that the defendant 
actually committed the crime. The case that the jury hears reflects 
events surrounding the subject crime. Consi9-ering the differing quality 
of prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges, the evidence presented 
truth. See Sagan, supra note 17, at 17 ("The whole idea of a democratic application of skep-
ticism is that everyone should have the essential tools to effectively and constructively evalu-
ate claims to knowledge."). 
49. People may be absolutely, but unjustifiably, certain of the truth of various proposi-
tions. Consider a person who denies that the Holocaust occurred. While that person may 
believe the Holocaust did not occur for various reasons, in order to be justifiably certain that 
the Holocaust did not occur, he must contemplate the possibility that the Holocaust occurred 
and face the overwhelming evidence that it did occur. For an exposition against Holocaust 
denial theory, see generally DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE 
GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND MEMORY (1993). 
50. See L. Jonathan Cohen, The Role of Evidentiary Weight in Criminal Proof, 66 B.U. 
L. REV. 635, 637-39 (1986) (suggesting that the completeness of facts on which a judgment is 
made is important); but see Raz, supra note 34, at 765 ("Sometimes it is appropriate to em-
brace certain beliefs on fairly slender evidence, while at others an assurance that the matter 
was thoroughly investigated is a condition of rationality."). 
51. See Laufer, supra note 10, at 372-73,399-400 (suggesting that predispositions toward 
guilt or innocence have effects on final determinations of guilt or innocence). 
52 See Neil B. Cohen, The Costs of Acceptability: Blue Buses, Agent Orange, and Aver-
sion To Statistical Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 563, 566 (1986) ("Jurors are not witnesses to the 
events in question. Because jurors must rely on statements witnesses make, their verdicts 
can only be statements about the evidence presented, not statements about the underlying 
event."); Thomas & Pollack, supra note 7, at 5-6 (suggesting that since no one has perfect 
access to the truth, decisions are made based on evidence presented). 
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will re-create the events surrounding the crime with varying degrees of 
accuracy. What the jury believes, based on the evidence presented and 
the credibility of witnesses, will also reflect the related events with 
varying degrees of accuracy. What a jury believes (as represented by 
the verdict) and what actually occurred may be quite different. 53 
At trial, a defendant's actual innocence or guilt may be an abstrac-
tion.54 What is true is what the evidence indicates is true.55 If a jury in-
correctly believes evidence of innocence, guilty defendants will be ac-
quitted. Similarly, when a jury incorrectly believes evidence of guilt, 
innocent defendants will be convicted. Verdicts do not necessarily re-
flect truth; they reflect the evidence presented. 56 Rather than signifying 
society's moral condemnation of defendant,57 a guilty verdict may re-
flect the recognition that no exculpatory evidence was presented at 
trial.58 Nonetheless, society must trust that verdicts reflect correct con-
53. See Jacobsohn, supra note 41, at 53 ("The jury's objective-discovering the 'truth'-
is perhaps more accurately described as 'the truth as perceived by twelve individual ju-
rors.'"). 
54. This may explain the practice of some lawyers of ignoring the question of a client's 
guilt or innocence, since ultimately the system will declare what is guilt or the system's best 
guess regarding the truth. Cf. EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN To SEE 121 (1991) (in distinguish-
ing legal and moral guilt, renowned attorney Edward Bennett Williams has said that he 
leaves moral guilt "to the majestic vengeance of God."). 
55. See L. Jonathan Cohen, supra note 50, at 636-37 (reiterating the distinction between 
probability that defendant is guilty based on the facts presented and probability that defen-
dant is actually guilty). 
56. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367-68 (1972) ("No matter how careful courts 
are, the possibility of perjured testimony, mistaken honest testimony, and human error re-
main all too real. We have no way of judging how many innocent persons have been exe-
cuted but we can be certain that there were some.") (Marshall, J., concurring); Sundby, supra 
note 8, at 461-2 ("Given the limits of investigatory techniques and human knowledge, a sys-
tem that convicts only the guilty is generally acknowledged to be impossible."). 
57. Guilty verdicts often signify the moral condemnation of the defendant as one who 
does not live by society's standards. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (criminal 
conviction is stigmatic to defendant); Sundby, supra note 8, at 490 (suggesting that guilty 
verdict indicates jury's belief that societal norms defined by legislature have been broken); 
Underwood, supra note 44, at 1307 ("The second function of the reasonable doubt rule, its 
symbolic function, is to single out criminal convictions as peculiarly serious among the adju-
dications made by courts. The reason for doing this may be to enhance the moral force and 
deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. On this view, the rule increases the cost of conviction 
by increasing the opprobrium and stigma that accrue to those who are convicted."). Indeed, 
even in the civil setting, certain conduct that deviates from the norm is treated as quasi-
criminal. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,424 (1979) (explaining that the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard of proof is raised to clear and convincing in some situations 
when a civil defendant's reputation may be tarnished by a verdict). 
58. This somewhat cynical view of reasonable doubt is supported by the fact that many 
substantive trial errors, including objections that could have stopped the consideration of in-
criminating evidence, are waived once the trial concludes. If society were truly concerned 
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elusions even while recognizing that, in some cases, verdicts are wrong. 59 
If one is morally or practically certain of a defendant's guilt, he has 
no reasonable doubt about it. In order to eliminate reasonable doubt, a 
prosecutor must present evidence so compelling that no reasonable ju-
ror could reasonably conclude that the defendant might be innocent.60 
However, a reasonable doubt is not just any conceivable doubt.61 Mere 
possible or unreasonable doubts are discounted as legitimate reasons 
for acquittal under the reasonable doubt standard. If such doubts were 
deemed sufficient to support an acquittal,62 the resulting standard would 
have similar effects as requiring absolute certainty for conviction: Few 
defendants would be held responsible for crimes that juries were rea-
sonably certain that the defendants committed.63 
That the reasonable doubt standard forces jurors to ignore unrea-
sonable doubts when determining guilt is particularly important. Un-
about incarcerating or continuing to incarcerate only guilty individuals, all arguments that 
might create subsequent actual reasonable doubt would be cognizable, regardless of when 
discovered. 
59. Cf. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 {"It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law 
not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are 
being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about 
his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a 
criminal offense without convincing a proper fact finder of his guilt with utmost certainty."). 
60. This does not mean that only airtight cases will gamer convictions. A prosecutor 
need not prove that the subject crime happened in any particular manner. The prosecutor 
need only prove that defendant is guilty regardless of the manner in which the crime oc-
curred. For example, in a homicide case, a jury need not believe that the prosecutor proved 
precisely how the victim was killed; the jury need only believe that regardless of how the 
homicide occurred, the defendant must have been guilty. The prosecution's goal is to prove 
the facts in a way that jurors cannot infer from unproven facts that the defendant may be in-
nocent. An airtight case is helpful, but is not necessary for conviction. 
61. See Morano, supra note 19, at 523 n.119 ("[W]hat is reasonable doubt? ... It is not 
mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral 
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt.") (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850)). But see Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40 
(1990) (striking as unconstitutional an instruction that defined a reasonable doubt as follows: 
"[O]ne that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and 
conjecture. It must be such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty, raised in your 
mind by reasons of the unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof. A reason-
able doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a 
reasonable man can seriously entertain."). 
62. A version of an all-possible doubt rule may have been in place before the use of the 
reasonable doubt rule became widespread. See Morano, supra note 19, at 508,511. But see 
Shapiro, supra note 16, at 170 (arguing that juries were never allowed to acquit based on 
frivolous or unreasonable doubts). 
63. See Sundby, supra note 8, at 460 (suggesting that an all-possible doubt rule would 
result in far more guilty defendants being found not guilty than would be tolerated by soci-
ety). 
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reasonable doubts are still doubts, and as long as those doubts do not 
encompass literal impossibilities, they may reflect truth. Therefore, ig-
noring unreasonable doubts may result in the conviction of some num-
ber of innocent defendants. 64 Innocent defendants occasionally may be 
convicted based on evidence sufficient to overcome all reasonable 
doubts but insufficient to overcome some ostensibly unreasonable 
doubts that actually reflect reality. Rather than guaranteeing unerr-
ingly accurate verdicts, the reasonable doubt standard requires the 
elimination of sufficient doubt that society is comfortable sending a de-
fendant to prison. 65 Society has considered the possibility that a small 
percentage of defendants convicted pursuant to a reasonable doubt 
standard might be innocent, but has determined that the likelihood that 
defendants convicted under a reasonable doubt standard are guilty far 
outweighs the likelihood that they are innocent. 
Reasonable doubt flows from insufficient evidence, the lack of 
which makes certainty of the prosecution's assertion of defendant's guilt 
unwarranted. Unreasonable doubt stems largely from the possibility 
that nonexistent or unpresented evidence may explain a defendant's ac-
tions and exonerate him. Although the difference between reasonable 
and unreasonable doubt can be explained, whether a particular doubt is 
reasonable or unreasonable may be impossible to determine with any 
certainty in the context of a trial. The edge of reasonable doubt is, by 
definition, the edge of unreasonable doubt. 
64. See Victor, 511 U.S. 1, 18 (1994) (relating part of the jury charge in the trial court: 
"[A]bsolute or mathematical certainty is not required. You may be convinced of the truth of 
a fact beyond a reasonable doubt and yet be fully aware that possibly you may be mis-
taken."); Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[I]n a judicial proceeding in 
which there is a dispute about the facts of some earlier event, the fact finder cannot acquire 
unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened. Instead, all the fact finder can acquire is 
a belief of what probably happened."). Presumably, the doubt that may linger is based on 
the fact that jurors can never be completely certain about anything, rather than that a possi-
ble doubt based on the evidence suggests defendant may not have committed the crime 
charged. 
65. See Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, 108 HARV. L. REv. 
1955, 1968 (1995) ("Reasonable doubt is an amorphous standard that embodies that degree 
of certainty for conviction or doubt for acquittal necessary for society to tolerate a judgment 
that an individual is guilty of a crime."); Note, Winship on Rough Waters: The Erosion of the 
Reasonable Doubt Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1993) ("[A]s society's interest 
in crime control changes, society's assessment of the proper balance between erroneous con-
victions and erroneous acquittals may change[.]"). Such a recognition is not negative. At 
different times in history, different societies have required differing levels of proof. See Mo-
rano, supra note 19, at 508 ("[T]he reasonable doubt rule was actually a prosecutorial inno-
vation that had the effect of decreasing the burden of proof in criminal cases. Prior to the 
rule's adoption, juries were expected to acquit if they had any doubts-reasonable or unrea-
sonable--of the accused's guilt."). 
1998] REASONABLE CERTAINTY AND REASONABLE DOUBT 671 
Practical certainty requires that jurors be as certain as possible of a 
defendant's guilt before convicting the defendant. The reasonable 
doubt rule makes this requirement concrete by forcing the prosecution 
to eliminate all reasonable doubts from the minds of the jurors and is 
the mechanism by which society convinces itself that punishment is just. 
Whether such punishment is substantially just rests on the content of 
the reasonable doubt rule. How well the reasonable doubt standard 
serves its function depends largely on how jurors can construct and de-
fine reasonable doubt, how jurors can become convinced of a defen-
dant's guilt, and why jurors may remain unconvinced of a defendant's 
guilt. Before exploring the reasonable doubt rule further, we must see 
how the presumption of innocence helps further illuminate the goals of 
the reasonable doubt rule. 
C. Presumption of Innocence 
The reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of innocence 
work in tandem to help assure that defendants are convicted fairly. 
Reasonable doubt requires that jurors be thoroughly convinced of a de-
fendant's guilt before conviction. The presumption of innocence effec-
tively requires that jurors begin and end their inquiry with a skeptical 
mindset. That combination of enforced skepticism and a high level of 
proof helps lead to the identification and conviction of guilty defen-
dants almost exclusively.66 
Although termed a presumption, the presumption of innocence can 
be considered both something less than an evidentiary presumption and 
something more than an evidentiary presumption. Evidentiary pre-
sumptions can take very different forms and serve different purposes. 
Presumptions, weak or strong, require that an antecedent fact be 
proven before the presumption is effective. The presumption of inno-
cence requires no such proof. Weak presumptions can be rebutted and 
their effect eliminated with very little evidence.67 If the presumption of 
innocence only served a weak presumption's limited purpose, and only 
66. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 ("The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in 
the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of 
convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the pre-
sumption of innocence[.]"); Sundby, supra note 8, at 509 (suggesting that the presumption of 
innocence guards against erroneous convictions). 
67. For example, the mandatory presumption of discrimination that flows from a prima 
facie case in Title VII cases is a weak presumption that can be rebutted with very little evi-
dence. See generally, Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the 
New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 12 (1996). 
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required weak evidence of guilt before it was rebutted, it would hardly 
be necessary at all and certainly would not deserve the significance that 
has been attached to it. 68 Because the reasonable doubt standard re-
quires that strong proof of defendant's guilt be presented before convic-
tion, a presumption of innocence that functioned as a weak presump-
tion would serve no purpose.69 Similarly, the presumption of innocence 
is not a strong or conclusive presumption as that term is generally un-
derstood.70 Once proven, conclusive presumptions cannot be rebutted.71 
Thus, the presumption of innocence is neither a strong nor weak pre-
sumption. 
The presumption of innocence is not really a presumption at all;n it 
is a concept that requires that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt before a defendant is convicted.73 Rather than being a procedural 
68. Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court outlined the import of the pre-
sumption of innocence. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle 
that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axio-
matic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our 
criminal law."). See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of 
innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial 
under our system of criminal justice."); Sundby, supra note 8, at 457 ("More grandiose prose 
rarely is found than that used to describe the role of the presumption of innocence in Anglo-
American criminal law."). Some commentators have suggested that our reverence for the 
presumption of innocence has waned. See, e.g., Laufer, supra note 10; LeRoy Pernell, The 
Reign of the Queen of Hearts: The Declining Significance of the Presumption of Innocence-A 
Brief Commentary, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 393 (1989) 
69. If society needs a presumption of innocence to stop juries that have heard no evi-
dence of guilt from convicting, the system needs to confront a much larger problem. That 
problem is what to do about the same juries convicting based on slim evidence of guilt. If 
society is concerned about juries convicting on no evidence of guilt, it must be concerned 
about juries convicting based on evidence that is sufficient rebut the presumption of inno-
cence, but really strong enough to convince a reasonable jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The obvious answer is to rely on the reasonable doubt standard to stop those juries. The cir-
cular problem is that if the reasonable doubt standard stands in the way of convicting based 
on slim evidence, it should stand in the way of convicting based on no evidence. If reason-
able doubt does stand in the way, the presumption of innocence is unnecessary. 
70. Conclusive presumptions are those which, after proof of a basic fact, have the effect 
of a substantive rule of law. See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A 
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 803 (2d Ed. 1982). 
71. For a general review of presumptions, see id. at 803-37. 
72 See Laufer supra note 10, at 403 (suggesting that if the presumption of innocence 
were a presumption, it would be treated differently than it is). 
73. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 n.12 (1978) (stating that the presumption 
of innocence "is better characterized as an 'assumption' that is indulged in the absence of 
contrary evidence"). The presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
are mirror images. If guilt has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption 
of innocence requires acquittal; if guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, no pre-
sumption of innocence exists. See Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278 (1993) ("Once the de-
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mechanism, the presumption of innocence has a substantive and impor-
tant effect. The presumption of innocence encourages a skeptical mind-
set in jurors that must be overcome before jurors can reach practical 
certainty and render a guilty verdict.74 Such a mindset encourages jurors 
to view the prosecution's claims of defendant's guilt guardedly until 
rendering a verdict.75 By requiring that jurors default to innocence un-
less the prosecution presents enough evidence of guilt to convince them 
of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the presumption of in-
nocence serves as a constant reminder to jurors that the prosecution 
must prove its case and validates the skeptical mindset necessary to 
reach justified certainty.76 As thus conceived, the presumption of inno-
cence and reasonable doubt work in tandem to produce sound verdicts 
while serving similar, but not identical, purposes.77 
fendant has been convicted fairly in the guilt phase of the trial, the presumption of innocence 
disappears."); Sundby, supra note 8, at 488 ("In short, innocence represents the interests at 
stake in a criminal trial which, as a result of the presumption of innocence, can be taken away 
only after every reasonable doubt has been given to the defendant."). But see Laufer, supra 
note 10, at 340-42 (criticizing the notion that the presumption of innocence's only function is 
to require that proof beyond a reasonable doubt be presented). 
74. In some comers, there are concerns regarding just how the presumption should be 
interpreted. For example, under a Bayesian model of guilt in which a defendant's guilt can 
be expressed as a probability, a strict presumption of innocence may require one to begin 
assuming a zero probability of defendant's guilt. The concern becomes that one who begins 
with a zero probability of guilt may not be able to be moved from that probability. The re-
sult would be an impossibility of conviction. Therefore, seemingly, one must entertain some 
probability of guilt before a trial begins. That notion troubles some Bayesians. See Stephen 
E. Fienberg & Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference For the Presentation 
of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771, 780 (1986) 
(stating the "somewhat uncomfortable presumption" that from a Bayesian evidentiary per-
spective, jurors must entertain some probability that defendant is guilty even before evidence 
is presented). For a different type of analysis on how jurors should approach the presump-
tion of innocence, see Laufer, supra note 10, at 403-11. 
75. Even though the presumption of innocence is a rule of thumb, a defendant is not 
automatically entitled to a presumption of innocence instruction. See Delo, 507 U.S. at 278 
("But even at the guilt phase, the defendant is not entitled automatically to an instruction 
that he is presumed innocent of the charged offense."); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 
789 (1979) (per curiam) ("In short, the failure to give a requested instruction on the pre-
sumption of innocence does not in and of itself violate the Constitution."). The key consid-
eration is whether, given the totality of the circumstances, the risk exists that a jury might 
convict based on something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Taylor, 436 U.S. 
478, 485-86 (1978) (suggesting that while the 14th Amendment does not require a presump-
tion of innocence instruction, 14th Amendment due process protects what a presumption of 
innocence protects-the right to have a case decided purely on the evidence). 
76. See Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 278 (1993) ("The presumption operates at the 
guilt phase of a trial to remind the jury that the State has the burden of establishing every 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
77. See Whorton, 441 U.S. at 789-90 ("Quite apart from considerations of the burden of 
proof, the presumption of innocence 'cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the 
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That reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence are re-
lated is undeniable.78 Understanding the relationship between them re-
quires recognizing that the pairing of the two concepts forces a juror to 
move from a subjective state of disbelief regarding the prosecution's 
claims of defendant's guilt to a subjective state of justified certainty re-
garding defendant's guilt. That the juror must be so transformed en-
sures that the evidence used to convict a defendant will be powerful. 
Reasonable doubt requires only that a juror be subjectively certain that 
defendant committed the crime before voting for guilt. A juror can 
reach a subjective, but possibly unjustified, state of certainty in the ab-
sence of a presumption of innocence.79 The presumption of innocence 
requires that jurors think more deeply than they otherwise would about 
whether all reasonable doubts have been eliminated before convicting a 
defendant. 
Theoretically, the justice system could employ a weak presumption 
of guilt, yet retain a reasonable doubt standard. However, under such a 
system, the prosecution might not have to produce nearly as much evi-
dence to convince the jury to a reasonable certainty than it does under 
the current system.80 If a presumption of guilt were coupled with a rea-
suspicion that arises form the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their 
conclusion solely from the legal evidence adduced."') (citing 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE sec. 
2511, at 407 (3d ed. 1940)) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
78. See Sundby, supra note 8, at 458 ("In the criminal trial setting, the presumption of 
innocence is given vitality primarily through the requirement that the government prove the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."); Smith, supra note 25, at 1843 n. 179 ("The 
presumption of innocence does not represent the same concept as does the reasonable doubt 
standard of proof. The presumption of innocence merely places the burden of proof on the 
state, while the reasonable doubt standard represents the degree of proof necessary to satisfy 
this burden."); see also Diamond, supra note 40, at 1717 (arguing that reasonable doubt pro-
vides teeth for the presumption of innocence). 
79. The system counts on the presumption of innocence to make sure that guilt is 
proven rather than assumed. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) ("Recognizing 
that jurors are quite aware that tire defendant appearing before them did not arrive there by 
choice or happenstance, we have never tried, and could never hope, to eliminate from trial 
procedures every reminder that the State has chosen to marshal its resources against a de-
fendant to punish him for allegedly criminal conduct. To guarantee a defendant's due proc-
ess rights under ordinary circumstances, our legal system has instead placed primary reliance 
on the adversary system and the presumption of innocence."). But see Laufer, supra note 10, 
at 390 (opining that eliminating the presumption of innocence as currently conceived would 
have a minimal effect on trials). 
80. Jurors would not have to disregard suspicion arising from fact that the defendant 
had been brought to court to answer charges. Cf Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786,789-90 
(1979) (per curiam) (stating that presumption of innocence requires that defendants be con-
victed based solely on trial evidence); Taylor, 436 U.S. at 485 (1978) ("[O]ne accused of a 
crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence 
introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or 
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sonable doubt standard, the quantity and quality of evidence necessary 
to convince a jury of a defendant's guilt could be relatively low. Such a 
low evidentiary threshold might result in a substantial number of inno-
cent defendants being convicted and would provide little confidence in 
guilty verdicts.81 
Similarly, a presumption of innocence can function independently of 
the level of proof necessary for conviction. A presumption of innocence 
could be effective even if a clear and convincing standard were the level 
of proof required for criminal conviction. That system would simply 
lower the level of certainty that a juror would need to reach before con-
victing. The presumption of innocence would guide the jury's decision 
whenever guilt had not been proven to a clear and convincing standard. 
The conceptual independence of the presumption of innocence and rea-
sonable doubt suggests that their coupling may reinforce the goals that 
each protects separately. Indeed, the coupling functionally protects de-
fendants and society from guilty verdicts based on an insufficient level 
of proof or relatively weak evidence that might flow if either were ap-
plied in isolation.82 
When combined with the reasonable doubt rule, the presumption of 
innocence ensures that a jury's verdict reflects antecedent skepticism. 
A juror is required to be skeptical of the prosecution's claim of guilt un-
til all reasonable doubts have been removed because that jury must em-
brace innocence unless guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.83 A 
reasonable doubt standard applied without skepticism amounts to little, 
because skepticism creates the doubt that must be overcome before 
conviction. Overcoming the doubts of an unskeptical juror proves little 
and should not yield a verdict in which society should be confident, 
even though the verdict may reflect truth. However, by forcing jurors 
to view the prosecution's claim of guilt through the lens of innocence, 
other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial."). 
81. Obviously, a high level of proof results in some guilty defendants being acquitted, 
which can also become problematic at a point. See Sundby, supra note 8, at 500 {"The unde-
niable cost of the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt rule is that some guilty 
individuals will avoid conviction {of course, the cost does buy a significant gain in that inno-
cent individuals are spared erroneous condemnation and punishment)."). 
82 Cf. Sundby, supra note 8, at 494 {"The presumption of innocence ... as expressed 
through the reasonable doubt rule, developed within the very specific context of ensuring 
against erroneous jury verdicts of guilty."); Underwood, supra note 44, at 1306 ("[T]he 
[reasonable doubt] rule is meant to affect the outcome of individual cases, reducing the like-
lihood of an erroneous conviction."). 
83. At least one commentator has suggested that the presumption of innocence be re-
structured as an assumption of a defendant's factual innocence. See Laufer, supra note 10. 
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society recognizes that using a skeptical mindset is the best way to de-
termine whether a particular proposition is correct,84 particularly when 
being correct can be the difference between incarcerating an innocent 
defendant or a guilty one.85 
For a jury to assert guilt, it should be quite certain of defendant's 
guilt after first being skeptical or uncertain of the defendant's guilt. 
Only when these two conditions are met should society accept a guilty 
verdict and incarcerate a defendant. The presumption of innocence and 
the reasonable doubt standard are the mechanisms the criminal justice 
system uses to inject the required certainty and skepticism that pro-
duces reliable verdicts. Part III will explore differing interpretations 
and uses of reasonable doubt and consider their possible impact on the 
criminal justice system. 
III. APPLYING SKEPTICISM 
In order to determine truth, the criminal justice system requires that 
jurors listen to evidence and apply their common sense and experience 
to that evidence. In that process, jurors must determine what evidence 
they believe, then determine what they think occurred based on their 
evaluation of the evidence. Once jurors determine what they believe 
happened, they apply the reasonable doubt standard to assure them-
selves of a defendant's guilt or lack of guilt. Finally, they issue a verdict. 
Though the process sounds simple, it may be more detailed in practice. 
Reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence require jurors 
to ask and answer difficult questions. Given the limits of evidence and 
our truth-seeking abilities, many of those questions may lead to uneasy 
conclusions about guilt, innocence, and the fairness of incarceration. 
This section will review the questions that the system should force ju-
rors to ask themselves and explain how they should answer those ques-
tions in light of the requirements of practical certainty and reasonable 
doubt. In some circumstances, the strict demands of reasonable doubt, 
practical certainty, and the presumption of innocence may create an 
atmosphere in which jurors must suspend the ideals of the justice sys-
tem in order to keep the justice system functioning reasonably. 
84. Cf Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (1970) (indicating that the presumption of innocence 
and reasonable doubt are tools to lower the incidence of factual error); Sundby, supra note 8, 
at 459 ("How far we extend the presumption of innocence is an issue of balancing society's 
interest in controlling crime and society's interest in not convicting innocent individuals."). 
85. For a criminal defense counsel's view on the moral, ethical and philosophical under-
pinnings of the presumption of innocence, see Joseph C. Cascarelli, Presumption of Inno-
cence and Natural Law: Machiavelli and Aquinas, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 229 (1996). 
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A. The Search for Truth (or Practical Certainty) 
Determining how to find truth is possibly the most important part of 
finding truth.86 Society, through the justice system, attempts to find 
truth by directing jurors to look at a body of evidence and analyze it 
through the lens of their experiences.87 Though this process seems the 
only reasonable method to determine truth, the requirement that legal 
facts be proven through evidence rather than through irrational proof 
was a watershed in the development of evidence law.88 That epistemo-
logical change has had a profound effect on the Anglo-American justice 
system. 89 Whether future changes in legal thought processes are ac-
cepted as viable methods of proof will depend on how helpful they ap-
pear to be in discovering truth. 90 
The justice system's rules and procedures should, and to some de-
gree do, mirror how individuals attempt to determine truth.91 The sys-
86. As Part II made clear, absolute certainty of truth is impossible to attain in the con-
text of a criminal trial. For purposes of the rest of this article, truth should generally be read 
as "the truth as we believe it to be." Where truth refers to absolute truth, the reference will 
be clear. 
87. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S.121, 140 (1954) ("the jury must use its expe-
rience with people and events in weighing the probabilities" regarding guilt and innocence); 
Richard A Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 838 (1988) 
(stating that experience is one of many analytical methods included in practical reason); 
Francis, supra, note 35, at 72, 73 (commenting on pragmatists' view that experience can cre-
ate knowledge); Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Mythology, and the "Acceptability of Verdicts" 
Thesis, 66 B.U. L. REv. 541, 549 (1986) (stating that in evaluating evidence, whatever con-
clusion is reached "will be a function of analyzing what the person perceives in the context of 
that person's lmowledge and experience."); Sundby, supra note 8, at 501 (suggesting that ju-
ries use common sense and experience when deliberating). 
88. See Laufer, supra note 10, at 330-31 (describing trials by ordeal and irrational 
proofs); Shapiro, supra note 16, at 155 (noting the demise of irrational proofs such as trial by 
ordeal); Keane, supra note 22, at 1250 (providing examples of trial by ordeal); Thomas & 
Pollack, supra note 7, at 4 (detailing parts of the epistemological change away from irrational 
proof). Of course, enlightenment thought and the development of the scientific method for-
ever altered society's view of the world surrounding it. See generally Sherry, supra, note 21. 
89. Some social commentators believe that the rules underlying why we believe what we 
believe are changing for the worse. See, e.g., Neal Gabler, OJ. Could Walk in an Unthinking 
Nation, NEWSDAY, Aug. 14, 1995, at A19 ("Change the rules of epistemology, and you 
change the culture. Make people doubt what their reason tells them to be true, and you have 
altered reality ... [FJor more than 20 years, we have been immersed in a culture of distrust. 
We have not only become wary of everything we see and hear but increasingly susceptible to 
the most outrageous leaps of illogic. In a world where the rational is under steady attack, the 
preposterous fills the vacuum."). 
90. See Zuckerman, supra note 5, at 497 ("Trust in the fact-finding process is, to a con-
siderable extent, a function of confidence in the reasoning processes employed in factfind-
ing."). Cf. Thomas & Pollack, supra note 7, at 3 ("The purpose of a mechanism for deciding 
guilt is to impose punishment only on those who deserve it."). 
91. Indeed, some definitions of reasonable doubt reference the state vf certainty that 
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tern's reliance on various procedures and rules is a recognition that so-
ciety believes those procedures and rules are or have been reliable aids 
to truth-seeking.92 For example, direct and cross examination are used 
in the adversarial justice system because they are reasonable methods 
to discover truth.93 Indeed, the perceived success of the adversary sys-
tem explains its continued use here in the United States.94 
The processes through which society and individuals determine 
truth are grounded in experience. Everyday experience informs what 
information should be used to make decisions, as well as that informa-
tion's trustworthiness.95 Rules of evidence reflect society's generalized 
calculus regarding what evidence is useful in proving propositions true. 96 
Those rules block out evidence so that jurors can determine guilt based 
on an appropriate set of evidence.97 Consequently, rules of evidence 
also reflect societal skepticism and epistemology.98 Various kinds of evi-
non-jurors need when deciding life's decisions outside of the context of a criminal trial. How-
ever, some commentators do not like such instructions. See, e.g., Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., 
Instructing on Reasonable Doubt After Victor v. Nebraska· A Trial Judge's Certain Thoughts 
on Certainty, 41 VILL. L. REV. 365, 428 (1996) (criticizing the "hesitate to act" jury instruc-
tion as inappropriately comparing everyday tasks with adjudication); Newman, supra note 4, 
at 982-83. 
92. Other societies rely on other methods to seek truth. See Myron Moskovitz, The OJ. 
Inquisition: A United States Encounter With Continental Criminal Justice, 28 V AND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 1121 (1995) (using the 0. J. Simpson case to illuminate differences in fact-
finding processes between the Anglo-American and Continental systems). The continental 
inquisitorial method is a different method of truth seeking. Presumably, societies that use 
these other methods believe that such methods have been successful in discovering truth. 
93. See 5 J. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1367, (J. Chadbourn rev., 1974) 
("Cross-examination" is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth .... "). 
94. Comments proclaiming the glory of the adversarial system abound. See, e.g., David 
A. Schum, Comment, 66 B.U. L. REV. 817,817 (1986) ("Anyone who reads scholarly works 
on evidence law will eventually encounter Sir Matthew Hale's assertion that our adversarial 
legal system-involving the parties in contention, their counsels, and the tribunal-'beats and 
boults out the truth.'"). 
95. See Allen, supra note 87. 
96. See Paul Butler, The Evil of American Criminal Justice: A Reply, 44 U.C.L.A. L. 
REv. 143, 155 (1996) (suggesting that the rules of evidence reflect the legislature's possibly 
incorrect judgment of the facts relevant to adjudication). Cf. Morano, supra note 19, at 514 
("The [early] rules of evidence attempted to prevent the jurors from reaching irrational or 
erroneous conclusions based upon irrelevant or unreliable information."); Shapiro, supra 
note 16 at 185 (in referencing an historical treatise on evidence: "[L]egal facts were no dif-
ferent from others, although the law sometimes added special requirements such as excluding 
certain kinds of testimony to insure that the search for truth would in no way be contami-
nated."). 
97. Obviously, rules of evidence can serve other purposes as well. Nonetheless, if rules 
of evidence are not generally calculated to help find the truth, it is unclear why they exist. 
98. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 155 (stating that rules regarding "the evaluation by 
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dence have been deemed useful or not useful in determining truth. 99 
Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible, in large part, because it is 
not trustworthy in the trial context.100 Conversely, bias evidence is spe-
cifically admissible because society believes that knowing a witness's in-
terest in a case may help in evaluating the truth of the evidence that the 
witness provides.101 Generally, if evidentiary rules do not reflect how 
society actually determines truth, those rules ought not exist.102 If these 
rules do not reflect how society should determine truth generally, they 
should not exist because they are unhelpful in finding truth as society 
defines truth. Once society determines what types of evidence may help 
determine truth and how they may do so, 103 how to determine what the 
the jury of the evidence ... are drawn from the culture's general understanding of how we 
'know' things to be true."). 
99. See FED. R. Evm. 102 ("These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in ... 
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may 
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."); Shapiro, supra note 16, at 175 
(Traditionally, legal and evidentiary rules "though not directly derived from philosophical 
principles, ha[ve] to be seen as conforming to the sound epistemological and logical princi-
ples developed by contemporary philosophy."). 
100. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or The Event?, On Judicial Proof and The Ac-
ceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357,1369 n.33 (1985) ("Hearsay rules and excep-
tions, for example, are typically rationalized in terms of the reliability of the evidence and 
the necessity of its use.") [hereinafter Nesson, The Evidence or The Event?]. Of course, 
there are many hearsay exceptions that override the system's general distrust of hearsay. See 
FED. R. Evm. 803. Of course, some European courts allow hearsay even more broadly than 
we do in the United States. See Moskovitz, supra note 92, at 1143-44 (explaining hearsay dif-
ferences between the United States system of justice and the European system through a 
colloquy among American lawyers and various actors in the European system). 
101. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) ("Proof of bias is almost always 
relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has histo!ically been 
entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testi-
mony."). 
102. Obviously, particular evidentiary rules exist to serve interests broader than or tan-
gential to absolute truth-seeking. See Newman, supra note 4, at 1000 ("For example, courts 
do not permit juries to consider evidence that all the world regards as probative in ordinary 
dealings among people-the fact that the defendant has committed the same offense on prior 
occasions. We accept such evidence, somewhat hypocritically, for the 'limited' purpose of 
impeaching the credibility of the occasional defendant who testifies. But when the defendant 
does not testify, we normally exclude such evidence, not because it is irrelevant, but because 
it is too relevant-that is, because it might too readily lead the jury to convict."). 
103. Of course, rules of evidence can change over time. DNA matching is an example 
of evidence whose credibility has increased over time. See generally, Development in the 
Law, Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1557 
(1995) (discussing DNA Evidence). While the conclusions to be drawn from DNA evidence 
are championed and questioned daily, its general utility is not. It is viewed as some of the 
most reliable evidence available. Technology may raise expectations and affect evidentiary 
analysis. Before fingerprint analysis was widely accepted as reliable, no reasonable juror 
could suggest that the lack of fingerprints at the scene of a crime suggested a weakness in a 
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truth is, or at least what we can be justifiably certain is true becomes 
important. After a body of evidence has been gathered, one must de-
termine what evidence is credible and determine how that evidence 
helps illuminate truth. Reason, experience and intuition combine to 
help jurors do this. 
Whether a particular piece of information or evidence is considered 
trustworthy or truthful often depends on intuition and experience. 
Consider the fairy tale of the boy who cried wolf. In the tale, the boy 
untruthfully cried wolf several times. After being fooled repeatedly, 
townspeople became skeptical of the boy's cries. The boy was later 
eaten by a wolf when townspeople subsequently disbelieved his truthful 
cries. Although the townspeople were wrong about the boy's truthful-
ness the final time the boy cried wolf, their evaluation of the evidence 
was sound. As earlier cries were verifiably false, the townspeople rea-
sonably concluded that the boy's cries were not to be believed. Since 
nothing differentiated the boy's last cry from his first, no reason existed 
to believe that the boy's last cry was truthful. Based on experience, the 
last cry was treated as untruthful, with tragic results. Indeed, a lesson of 
the fairy tale is not to lie, because people may not believe you when you 
tell the truth.104 
In evaluating evidence, people reason from known experiences to 
unknown experiences.105 Since people rarely analyze situations identical 
to past experiences, how people evaluate evidence when no direct ana-
log from experience exists is very important. If a direct analog existed, 
people could confidently judge new experiences solely by reference to 
past experiences. Although the conclusion regarding the new situation 
might be incorrect, the evaluative process would be reasonable. At 
some point, uncorroborated statements must be analyzed and the juror 
must believe that evidence is credible based on intuition rather than 
proor.t06 How an individual evaluates uncorroborated statements may 
prosecution's case. Today, a lack of fingerprints can reasonably suggest that defendant was 
not involved in the subject crime or that the defendant used gloves to prevent leaving finger-
prints. Regardless of which inference is made, the evidentiary landscape has changed from 
the pre-fingerprint days. 
104. Society has essentially codified this lesson in the rules of evidence. See FED. R. 
Evm. 608 (allowing evidence regarding a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthful-
ness.) 
105. Indeed, experience may be our only guide. See, e.g., Zuckerman, supra note 5, at 
488 ("[W]hen we hear that a suspect ran away from the scene of the crime after being ac-
cused of committing it, we tend to conclude that he was guilty, because experience has taught 
us that guilt is most frequently the reason for escape."). 
106. Cf. ANDREAS KAPARDIS, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 149-50 (1997) (suggesting that 
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depend largely on the truth of similar statements that she has heard.107 
The next time a townsperson hears a boy cry wolf, how she reacts will 
depend on the lessons learned from prior experience with boys crying 
wolf. 
B. A Juror's Search for Truth 
While jurors likely determine truth in the same manner as non-
jurors,108 their decisionmaking is more constrained than that of non-
jurors. Society at-large can assume truth based on probable truth or 
unproven belief. A juror can only find truth when she finds practical 
certainty of guile09 The juror's search for truth entails extra burdens 
and different considerations than the general public's search for truth. 
First, jurors often survey a different set of evidence than non-jurors in 
making decisions.110 Second, that a defendant's liberty is at stake means 
a juror's search for and location of guilt must be accurate.111 
Practical certainty and the presumption of innocence ensure that in 
searching for guilt, jurors must consider innocence. The accuracy of the 
determination of guilt depends heavily on the reasonable elimination of 
stories that jurors construct to explain evidence track their "gut feelings"). 
107. Whenever people are confronted with information, they must assimilate it into the 
knowledge that they already possess regarding the world. See Sally Frank, Eve Was Right To 
Eat the "Apple": The Importance of Narrative in the Art of Lawyering, 8 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM79, 83 (1996) ("An understanding of the meaning of a narrative is often culturally 
bound . . . . The reader interprets the story based on that reader's own culture and the re-
sources of his or her imagination. The reader then assimilates the narrative into the drama 
of his or her own life. The subjectivity of the reader is developed both by his or her position 
in society and his or her personal history."). 
108. There is little reason to believe that a juror's basic powers of analysis change when 
they become jurors. Indeed, jurors are told to analyze evidence as they would in real life. 
See id. 
109. See supra Part IT. 
110. See Jeremy Osher, Note, Jury Unanimity in California: Should It Stay Or Should It 
Go?, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1319, 1366 (1996) ("The jury's role is to adjudicate the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant based on the evidence presented in court. Any criticism of jury 
verdicts that fails to take into account the difference between the information that the public 
has access to and that the jury actually heard should be viewed with extreme caution."). Of 
course, the evidence the jury sees is often of higher quality than the evidence the public di-
gests. The body of evidence on which jurors make decisions is a filtered body that ostensibly 
includes just the evidence that is relevant to the case the jury must decide. The court of pub-
lic opinion is merely a referendum of citizens' opinions based on every snippet of information 
available, including information that society deems so irrelevant to determining truth that 
the jury is not allowed to hear it. That the jury hear important evidence and not consider 
unimportant evidence is, in part, what the Rules of Evidence guarantee. See FED. R. EVID. 
402 (excluding irrelevant evidence from trial). 
111. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
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possible innocence. A juror cannot reasonably find guilt unless she has 
searched in the context of innocence. In considering how a body of evi-
dence comports with a theory of innocence, technical definitions of rea-
sonable doubt are little more than admonitions to the jury to be very 
sure that a guilty verdict is correct before it is rendered.112 Of course, 
barring serious misconduct, a jury will always believe that its guilty ver-
dict is correct before sending a defendant to jail. While definitions of 
practical certainty and reasonable doubt are good starting points for the 
jury, a functional test capturing how jurors should determine whether 
they have reached practical certainty or whether their doubts are rea-
sonable may be helpful. A simple test for practical certainty and rea-
sonable doubt could require that a juror vote to acquit if he can con-
struct a reasonable scenario flowing from the evidence he believes that 
suggests defendant's innocence. This formulation comports with practi-
cal certainty because it assures that a juror is as certain as possible of 
defendant's guilt before convicting. 113 Conversely, even if one does not 
believe that this is the only way to view reasonable doubt, it certainly is 
a reasonable way to apply the reasonable doubt standard.114 
This test of practical certainty and re·asonable doubt describes a pre-
cise path to guilt or innocence by focusing on the process by which the 
juror reaches her verdict, rather than what the verdict is.115 Rather than 
being a different approach to guilt, it is merely a description of how to 
remove reasonable doubt. While not guaranteeing that innocent defen-
dants will never go to jail, this calculus of reasonable doubt helps guar-
antee that innocent defendants will not be imprisoned due to a jury's 
112. Unfortunately, reasonable doubt may simply be whatever the twelve jurors think it 
should mean. See Diamond, supra note 40, at 1722 (arguing reasonable doubt lacks common 
usage and understanding). 
113. This is what practical certainty requires. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying 
text. 
114. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 12 ("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt ... signifies such 
proof as satisfies the judgment and consciences of the jury, as reasonable men, and applying 
their reason to the evidence before them, that the crime charged has been committed by the 
defendant, and so satisfies them as to leave no other reasonable conclusion possible.") 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1, 24 (1875)); Nesson, The Evidence or The 
Event?, supra note 100, at 1371 (suggesting that reasonable alternative hypotheses suggesting 
innocence can reasonably yield acquittal); Nesson, Permissive Inferences, supra note 5, at 
1208-15 (suggesting that satisfactory explanations in the face of evidence sufficient to indi-
cate lack of reasonable doubt may indicate reasonable doubt). 
115. See Smith, supra note 25, at 1834 ("The essence of the reasonable doubt standard is 
the reasoning process. It is easier to think of the reasonable doubt standard as a qualitative 
state of mind than as a quantifiable degree of belief. This is because proof beyond a reason-
able doubt is only accomplished when the trier of fact has reached that self-defined state of 
mind which is free of reasonable doubt."). 
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possible misapplication of the reasonable doubt standard. Conse-
quently, it should mirror a jury's deliberation process, even if it actually 
does not. 
Reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence require that a 
juror explore her assertion (by a guilty verdict) that she is convinced to 
a practical certainty that defendant committed the crime by forcing her 
to consider whether the defendant plausibly did not commit the crime.116 
Examining the argument from the perspective of innocence may alter or 
cement the juror's certainty regarding guilt.117 Unless a juror refocuses 
on the possibility of innocence, she may reach his verdict without fully 
appreciating what convinced her of guilt.118 This functional formulation 
is not an extra burden on the jury. Any juror who is convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt should have no problem meeting the functional test. 
If a jury adequately considers defendant's possible innocence, it loses 
nothing by explicitly following the aforementioned test.119 
If trial evidence affords any reasonable possibility of defendant's in-
nocence that cannot be explained away by additional evidence or infer-
ences from additional evidence, a juror cannot be sufficiently certain of 
defendant's guilt to convict under. the reasonable doubt standard. Con-
versely, if no reasonable explanations suggesting defendant's innocence 
exist, all doubts based on reason are gone, and the defendant should be 
116. The functional formulation of reasonable doubt forces jurors to take a final serious 
look at their work before rendering a verdict. In reviewing cases at the appellate level, 
courts seem unwilling to review seriously the sufficiency of evidence in criminal cases. See 
Newman, supra note 4, at 993 ("My concern is that federal appellate courts, including my 
own, examine a record to satisfy themselves only that there is some evidence of guilt and do 
not conscientiously assess whether the evidence suffices to permit a finding by the high de-
gree of persuasion required by the 'reasonable doubt' standard."). 
117. See Moran, supra note 16, at 71 ("Certitude is a type of assent, but it describes only 
those types of assents which one has self-consciously evaluated. If such self-scrutiny does not 
reveal some conditionality in one's attitude to the proposition, one has certitude. One who 
merely assents without reflection has no thought of any doubt but might find one if she ex-
amined her assent closely. In contrast, someone who has certitude cannot be made any more 
sure of the proposition. In Newman's example, a person who has certitude that India exists 
cannot be made more certain of its existence by personally visiting it."). 
118. For example, a parent may be certain that her child is well-behaved, even though 
insufficient evidence exists to make such a general statement. The child may be ill-mannered 
whenever she is outside of the parent's view. The parent's certainty is not unreasonable 
given the child's actions while in the parent's presence. However, the evidence on which the 
parent bases her observation must be considered incomplete. See L. Jonathan Cohen, supra 
note 50, at 639-43 (relating weight of evidence to completeness of the evidence offered). 
119. Even if one does not agree that this is the only way to eliminate reasonable doubt, 
a juror who believes that she cannot be practically certain of a defendant's guilt if the real 
possibility of innocence exists can hardly be deemed to be acting outside of the definition of 
reasonable doubt. 
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convicted. By definition, this approach eliminates the possibility that a 
juror will find a defendant guilty while knowing that a plausible sce-
nario exists under which defendant is innocent.120 If a juror can con-
struct a reasonable scenario, consistent with the evidence, under which 
a defendant is innocent, that juror ought to have a reasonable doubt as 
to defendant's guilt because that reasonable scenario may reflect truth. 
This is the logical conclusion of the application of practical certainty, 
reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence. A concern may be 
that this functional approach appears to allow the hypothecation of 
facts that may lead to unreasonable doubts. It does not. This functional 
formulation of reasonable doubt focuses only on the evidence that the 
jury has heard and believes. Rather than hypothesizing facts favorable 
to the defense, jurors will only examine the facts as they believe them to 
be and assure themselves that the defendant is guilty.121 Any reasonable 
doubt formulation suggesting that all hypothetical facts pointing to de-
fendant's innocence must be considered or credited by the jury or both 
does not comport with historical conceptions of reasonable doubt, 122 
contemporary conceptions of reasonable doubt,123 or this Article's func-
tional conception of reasonable doubt. 
Any alternative scenario is somewhat hypothesized if it is fashioned 
from facts that are unproven or unprovable. However, the use of un-
proven facts does not necessarily make an alternative scenario unrea-
120. A not guilty verdict is a statement that the defendant might be innocent. If no rea-
son exists to believe that defendant might be innocent, a jury should convict defendant. 
121. More than 100 years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that hypothesizing facts in the 
trial setting is improper. See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440 (1887). Nonetheless, a jury 
must be allowed to evaluate the evidence, jettison disbelieved "facts" and even refuse to 
make certain inferences that arguably flow from the credited evidence. To that end, a jury 
may ultimately believe a set of facts that does not embrace or completely comport with all of 
the evidence presented at trial. For example, Joe is on trial for stabbing Jane. Jane testifies 
that Joe stabbed her. Other evidence shows that after Jane was stabbed, she fell on her at-
tacker. When Joe was arrested at the scene of the crime, he had blood on his clothes, as did 
Bob, the only other person at the scene of the crime. Assuming that the jury is not com-
pletely convinced that Jane knows who stabbed her, the jury will have to examine the re-
maining evidence and hypothesize regarding Joe's guilt or innocence. Regardless of the 
jury's verdict, it has been the product of analysis and guess work. This is the jury process, 
and it is wholly appropriate. 
122 See, e.g., Morano, supra note 19, at 522 (recalling the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court's 1841 denial of a defense counsel's request that the "trial judge ... instruct the 
jury that they could not find the defendant guilty unless all the circumstances were such as to 
be inconsistent with any other hypothesis than an intention to [commit the offense].") 
(internal quotations omitted). 
123. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
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sonable.124 If we believe that a defendant need not present evidence of 
innocence to be acquitted, an acquittal can be based, in part, on un-
proven facts and inferences flowing from unproven facts. If a prosecu-
tion team fails to meet its initial burden of proof due to facts left un-
proven and inferences left unexplored, a defendant who does not 
present a defense must be acquitted because the prosecution has not 
foreclosed the possibility that an innocent explanation exists for the 
facts presented by the prosecution. Although the facts on which the ac-
quittal rests may have been hypothesized by the jury, that they were not 
even marginally foreclosed by the prosecution makes their hypotheca-
tion reasonable.125 The key to fashioning a reasonable alternative sce-
nario is to rely on reasonable facts whose truth has not been foreclosed 
by the prosecution's case. Such reasonable hypothecation stems from 
reasonable inferences made by jurors skeptical of defendant's guilt. 
Conversely, doubts rooted in unreasonably hypothetical facts having 
no basis in evidence are either unreasonable or existential doubts.126 
Reasonable doubt based on the real possibility of innocence is not exis-
tential doubt that exists regarding all legal facts. If a juror has a reason-
able doubt, she should vote to acquit because the defendant plausibly 
and arguably did not commit the crime. A juror need not be convinced 
that the defendant did not commit the crime in order to acquit. Rather, 
a juror need only believe that the defendant might not have committed 
the crime. Any lesser requirement arguably lowers the reasonable 
doubt standard. While belief that a defendant probably committed the 
crime might suffice under a preponderance of the evidence or clear and 
convincing standard, such a belief does not rise to the belief beyond a 
reasonable doubt necessary for criminal conviction.127 The existence of 
a reasonable alternative scenario of innocence indicates reasonable 
doubt because a juror cannot be certain of a defendant's guilt if a rea-
124. Cf. L. Jonathan Cohen, supra note 50, at 642 ("Sometimes the prosecution cannot 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because some crucial issue happens in practice to be 
undeterminable."). 
125. Probletns may arise when jurors hypothesize unreasonable facts and inferences 
that have not been foreclosed by the prosecution. This is particularly so when the facts are 
so unusual that a reasonable prosecutor or society would not deem the foreclosure of the 
facts necessary to remove reasonable doubt. H the facts hypothesized are particularly un-
usual, foreclosure of those facts becomes necessary only to remove unreasonable doubt. 
Since unreasonable doubt is not an appropriate ground for acquittal, a jury that requires that 
unreasonable doubts be removed before conviction acts improperly. 
126. This is the existential doubt that cannot be the basis for reasonable doubt. See su-
pra Part ll, generally. 
127. See supra Part ll.B. 
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sonable possibility of innocence exists.128 The presumption of innocence 
forces jurors to default to innocence in such cases.129 
Either evidence presented by the defendant, including cross-
examination, or the lack of evidence presented by the prosecution can 
lead to belief in a reasonable alternative scenario.130 Since a defendant 
need not prove anything in order to be acquitted, how much evidence is 
necessary to convince a juror that an alternative scenario is reasonable 
is important. What evidence particular jurors credit and what facts they 
believe will vary. The inferences that jurors will derive from those facts 
will vary even more widely.131 Consequently, alternative scenarios 
deemed reasonable by some will be considered unreasonable by others. 
If jurors believe different facts and make different inferences, they can 
reach different conclusions regarding the existence of reasonable alter-
native scenarios regarding a defendant's guilt. The reasonableness of 
an alternative scenario and the reasonableness of the doubt depends on 
the evidence a juror believes rather than the conclusion of guilt or inno-
cence that the juror reaches. 
Under the functional formulation, distinguishing unreasonable al-
ternative scenarios from reasonable alternative scenarios distinguishes 
unreasonable doubt from reasonable doubt. The willingness to believe 
reasonable alternative scenarios for which little or no hard evidence 
exists is the jury's fact-finding prerogative. In some cases, the jury can 
reasonably doubt the prosecution's case just because the case lacks air-
tight evidence or can reasonably doubt uncontroverted evidence when 
such doubt is based on a lack of credibility. Simply, a jury can legiti-
mately acquit even in the face of strong evidence. Since a conviction 
128. See supra note 112. 
129. See supra Part II. C. 
130. That evidence is not presented may lead to the inference that such evidence does 
not exist. See David H. Kaye, Do We Need A Calculus of Weight To Understand Proof Be-
yond A Reasonable Doubt?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 657, 663-64 (1986) (stating that jurors make 
negative inferences when they do not hear evidence that they expected to hear). Cf. Craig 
R. Callen, Comment Second-Order Considerations, Weight, Sufficiency and Schema Theory: 
A Comment on Professor Brilmayer's Theory, 66 B.U. L. REV. 715, 716 (1986) ("Cohen ex-
plains that for a juror to infer that there exists no reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
guilty, the juror must rely not only on her judgment based on the evidence introduced at trial, 
but also on her judgment that relevant data which was not presented would not have exoner-
ated the defendant."). 
131. See KAPARDIS, supra note 106, at 150 ("It is thus possible for two members of the 
same jury, exposed to the same evidence, to arrive at a different verdict because of differ-
ences in how they have understood and interpreted the same evidence."); Raz, supra note 34, 
at 768 (suggesting that even when different people have the same evidence, reasonable dif-
ferences of opinion may occur based on "differences in judgment understood as differences 
in the assessment of the evidence"). 
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rests on a jury's abiding belief that each element of the subject crime 
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and slender evidence can 
destroy a juror's abiding belief, slender evidence can block a convic-
tion.132 
Conversely, problems may arise when jurors hypothesize unreason-
able facts and inferences that have not been foreclosed by the prosecu-
tion. This is particularly so when the facts are so unusual that a reason-
able prosecutor would not deem the foreclosure of the facts necessary 
to remove reasonable doubt.133 If the facts are particularly unusual, 
foreclosure of those facts becomes necessary only to remove unreason-
able doubt. Since unreasonable doubt is not an appropriate ground for 
acquittal, a jury that requires that unreasonable doubts be removed acts 
improperly. Now we must begin to consider what makes a doubt rea-
sonable or unreasonable. 
C. Applying Practical Certainty and Reasonable Doubt 
Having provided a functional formulation of practical certainty and 
reasonable doubt, applying this standard to concrete hypotheticals to 
see how it works in practice may be useful. Reasonable doubt (as de-
fined by practical certainty) and the presumption of innocence require 
the juror to consider whether defendant reasonably could be innocent 
based on the evidence the juror believes. In analyzing how jurors de-
termine the reasonable possibility of innocence, we will consider two 
hypothetical cases, one loosely based on a hypothetical traffic stop and 
one loosely based on the Oklahoma City bombing case.134 
In the first hypothetical case, the defendant is charged with resisting 
arrest. The evidence in this hypothetical case is follows. During trial, 
the police officers who were at the scene testify that the defendant 
stood up and ran while he was in the process of being subdued. The of-
ficers admitted that several officers were at the seen when the defen-
dant was subdued and that they were using the force necessary to sub-
132 See Newman, supra note 4, at 983 (suggesting that "generalized unease or skepti-
cism" may be a valid basis for reasonable doubt). 
133. For example, hypothesizing the existence of defendant's identical twin who actu-
ally committed the subject crime would be improper. However, hypothesizing that someone 
of similar height, build and facial structure committed the subject crime might not be im-
proper, particularly if a witness testifies to some uncertainty in the identification. 
134. On April 19, 1995, the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, was blown up in the worst act of domestic terrorism in the history of the United 
States. Timothy McVeigh was charged and convicted in the bombing. See Tom Kenworthy, 
McVeigh Appeal Alleges Errors In Bomb Case; Lawyers Cite Publicity, Inflammatory Evi-
dence, WASH. POST, Jan. 17,1998, at A8. 
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due the defendant when he fled. The defendant did not testify in his 
own defense. Defendant's defense is that he stood up and ran only be-
cause he was afraid of being beaten to death. Assume that the fear of 
being beaten to death would be a legitimate defense to resisting arrest. 
Consider how the jury may evaluate the evidence and defendant's 
defense. Based on real-life experience, jurors must be aware that sus-
pects may be beaten and can die when police officers subdue them.135 
Consequently, it cannot be outside of the realm of reasonable possibil-
ity that a suspect might be afraid for his life when being subdued by 
force by several police officers. Importantly, the jury may be left with-
out enough evidence to eliminate all reasonable scenarios of innocence. 
While the jury may have enough evidence to convict, if it believes the 
police officers, the jurors may exercise their common sense and mine 
their experiences to find a reasonable alternative scenario of innocence. 
The jurors may be unable to determine guilt to a practical certainty be-
cause practical certainty requires that a juror be as sure as possible that 
the defendant is guilty before conviction. Given what experience may 
tell some jurors, they may not be certain of the defendant's guilt. 
Some may suggest that the jurors' doubts are based not on the evi-
dence, but on limitations inherent in evidence. These suggestions may 
be correct, but they are irrelevant to the practical certainty inquiry. 
Practical certainty or reasonable doubt is the standard the criminal jus-
tice system uses because of the inherent limitations of fallible evidence, 
not the specific limitations of the evidence presented at trial. If the trial 
evidence does not foreclose reasonable alternative scenarios of inno-
cence, it is not necessarily due to inherent limitations of evidence, but 
rather may be due to the weakness of the evidence presented. That 
leaves the question of what to do when evidence bearing directly on a 
key factual issue to be determined in trial is unavailable. In this hypo-
thetical case, that evidence could be evidence of precisely how defen-
dants' being subdued affected his fear of being beaten. 
In order to make convictions possible in situations where direct evi-
dence is unavailable, courts have redefined the reasonable doubt stan-
dards in circumstantial evidence cases. The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that the burden of proof in circumstantial evidence cases should 
be articulated differently and that jurors may simply focus on convinc-
135. For example, on October 12, 1995, Johnny Gammage was killed during a traffic 
stop in suburban Pittsburgh after allegedly speeding and driving erratically. His story was 
well-publicized, in part, because Ray Seals, one of Gammage's cousins, is a former Pittsburgh 
Steeler professional football player. See Jan Ackerman, DA's Task in Gammage Death Case 
a Handful, PITISBURGH POST-GAZETIE, Dec. 31, 1995, at Al. 
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ing themselves that a defendant is guilty.136 This distinction between di-
rect evidence cases and circumstantial evidence cases appears to be 
necessary because the practical certainty burden of proof may be in-
surmountable in circumstantial evidence cases.137 However, this distinc-
tion is not really just limited to pure circumstantial evidence cases be-
cause many ultimate factual issues at trial can be based on 
circumstantial evidence. Once jurors determine what evidence they be-
lieve, if a question about a legal fact remains, it often will be because no 
direct evidence bears on that specific legal fact. When no such evidence 
exists, the remaining evidence regarding that issue is essentially circum-
stantial. Applying a somewhat lessened standard to issues which must 
be evaluated by circumstantial evidence may lead to applying that stan-
dard to many difficult cases or at least to the most difficult aspects of 
many cases. 
Nonetheless, the jury still must decide whether the defendant was 
afraid for his life. To answer that question the jury must rely on reason. 
Let us assume that the jurors in this case take two basic paths to their 
decision. One set of jurors believes that the defendant could have been 
afraid for his life, but because they are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he was not afraid for his life, they convict. The other set of 
jurors believes that the defendant could have been afraid for his life and 
because they cannot be convinced that he was not afraid for his life (due 
to the lack of evidence), they acquit. Though they come to different 
conclusions, both sets of jurors arguably evaluate the evidence correctly 
136. In cases where the evidence is purely circumstantial, courts suggest that a the juror 
should not focus solely on the reasonable possibility of innocence. See Holland v. United 
States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954) ("The petitioners assail the refusal of the trial judge to 
instruct that where the Government's evidence is circumstantial it must be such as to exclude 
every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. There is some support for this type of 
instruction in the lower court decisions, but the better rule is that where the jury is properly 
instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circum-
stantial evidence is confusing and incorrect.") (citations omitted); United States v. Russell, 
971 F.2d 1098, 1109 (4th Cir. 1992) ("It is well settled that as long as a proper reasonable 
doubt instruction is given, a jury need not be instructed that circumstantial evidence must be 
so strong as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt."); United States v. 
Stone, 748 F.2d 361,363 (6th Cir. 1984) ("It is not necessary that circumstantial evidence re-
move every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt."). Arguably, speculation regarding 
alternative scenarios in circumstantial evidence cases is somewhat like speculation regarding 
existential doubt in direct evidence cases. If the prosecution were required to remove rea-
sonable doubt in circumstantial evidence cases, few criminals would ever be convicted. 
137. While this may appear to be a reasonable attempt to deal with the reality that a 
strict application of the reasonable doubt standard to purely circumstantial cases would likely 
yield very few convictions, it actually illuminates the reality that a strict application of rea-
sonable doubt may yield few convictions in both circumstantial and direct evidence cases. 
690 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:655 
under our system.138 
The first set of jurors engage in a subjective reasonable doubt 
evaluation. They ask whether they have a reasonable doubt as to de-
fendant's guilt and answer that they do not. While the defendant could 
have been afraid for his life, those jurors have no reason to believe that 
the defendant was afraid for his life, so they convict. This is the essence 
of reasonable doubt as applied in circumstantial evidence cases. The 
second set of jurors engage in a slightly more objective reasonable 
doubt evaluation. They ask whether it is possible that the defendant 
was afraid for his life in this situation, and hence, is not guilty. Since the 
real possibility that defendant was afraid for his life has not been dis-
proved, those jurors believe that it is possible within reason that the de-
fendant is not guilty.139 This is the essence of practical certainty. Ap-
plying subjective reasonable doubt will likely allow juries to convict 
some reasonable number of guilty defendants; applying objective rea-
sonable doubt may not.140 Objective reasonable doubt describes the 
highest standard of proof that jurors can have in the absence of absolute 
certainty, and is practical certainty. However, the jurors do not act in-
appropriately when they apply subjective reasonable doubt because the 
criminal justice system allows subjective reasonable doubt to support 
guilt.141 
Now we can apply subjective and objective reasonable doubt to our 
second hypothetical. In the hypothetical, defendant is charged with 
various crimes stemming from the bombing of the Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City. For purposes of the hypothetical, assume 
that the simple question that the jury must answer is whether the defen-
138. I am not suggesting that all jurors will fit into one of these camps, just that it would 
be reasonable for jurors to fit into either of these camps. 
139. Some may argue that proving fear is likely an affirmative defense that must be 
proven by the defense. While that is likely true, it makes little difference to the concept of 
practical certainty. In the abstract, practical certainty requires that one be as certain of the 
proposition of guilt as possible. Regardless of who must prove what, the jury must be as sure 
as possible that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. This concern falls away in the 
second hypothetical. 
140. Rarely will an objective reasonable doubt standard lead to a guilty verdict when a 
subjective reasonable doubt standard would not. It is possible, but unlikely, that a juror 
could conclude that no objective reasonable possibility of innocence exists, but that a subjec-
tive reasonable possibility of innocence does. The juror would have to be certain that the 
defendant committed the crime, but remain unsure about his guilt for completely unarticula-
ble reasons. 
141. See note 136. Jurors may interpret the reasonable doubt standard as a command to 
apply subjective reasonable doubt. The lack of guidance that some reasonable doubt instruc-
tions provide and the desire to convict defendants who appear guilty may combine to con-
vince jurors that they are applying the correct reasonable doubt standard. See infra Part IV. 
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dant parked a truck containing explosives in front of the Murrah 
Building on the morning of the attack.142 Assume that the relevant tes-
timony is as follows. Defendant was identified as the person who last 
rented the truck that blew up the Murrah Building and was seen in close 
proximity to the truck in Oklahoma City on the day before the bomb-
ing. Additionally, defendant's fingerprints were found on a fragment of 
the truck and on items found close to where the truck had been parked 
the day before the bombing. Assume that the jury credits and believes 
all of this testimony. 
Assume that in response to the evidence, defendant's attorney 
claims that the truck was stolen from the defendant. The only evidence 
regarding the putative theft of the truck is defendant's police report that 
the truck was stolen. However, the truck had already exploded by the 
time the defendant made the police report. The government argues 
that the truck was not stolen and that defendant's report was a ruse. 
The evidence is arguably unclear regarding whether the defendant 
parked the truck in front of the Murrah building. While jurors could 
force themselves to decide whether the truck was actually stolen, such 
does not eliminate the impossibility of certainty regarding whether the 
defendant actually parked the truck. Rather, it merely forces the jurors 
to make a possibly ill-supported conclusion. The evidence whether the 
defendant drove the truck to the Murrah Building is largely circumstan-
tial.143 That no evidence places defendant with the truck the day of the 
bombing makes the relevant evidence circumstantial rather than direct. 
If the defendant does not testify, the jury may have no reasonable way 
of evaluating the veracity of the claim of theft except to ask how likely 
it is that the truck was stolen.144 A juror who is unsure if the truck was 
142. Asking this single question simplifies the analysis, but does not diminish it. Given 
that the jury must find each element of the crime satisfied to a reasonable doubt, a reason-
able jury could rest its decision on a very specific question. Parking the truck could be an act 
necessary to complete whatever crime the hypothetical defendant was charged with commit-
ting or could be the act the jury focused on to determine intent. 
143. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 70, at 151 ("Direct evidence is testimo-
nial evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue. Circumstantial evidence serves as 
a basis from which the trier of fact may make reasonable inferences about a matter at is-
sue.") Nonetheless, circumstantial evidence is not to be treated with less respect that direct 
evidence. ld. 
144. Nonetheless, the juror may answer the question. See Reid Hastie & Nancy Pen-
nington, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists' Reflections on The People of the 
State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 957 (1996) (suggesting 
generally that in order to determine their version of truth, jurors construct stories regarding 
what happened based on the evidence they believe and their background guesses regarding 
how to fill gaps in the evidence left by prosecutors and defense counsel). 
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stolen because the evidence does not sufficiently illuminate the issue 
cannot claim to be practically certain regarding whether the defendant 
parked the truck in front of the Murrah Building. 
Requiring the functional formulation of practical certainty to prove 
guilt becomes more troublesome if we consider doubts for which liter-
ally no evidence has been presented at trial. Assume that instead of of-
fering evidence that the truck was stolen, defendant's attorney argues 
that the prosecution has failed to offer any evidence suggesting that de-
fendant had driven the truck on the day of the bombing. A juror who 
suggests that no proof exists to foreclose the possibility that someone 
other than defendant drove the truck to the site may be exercising skep-
ticism reasonably. That no explicit evidence exists to support a par-
ticular doubt does not necessarily make the doubt unreasonable. Some 
doubts are based purely on common sense or experience, rather than on 
evidence presented at trial.145 Indeed, inferences in support of or in op-
position to guilt must flow from common sense and experience rather 
than from evidence that directly proves the statement to be inferred. If 
direct evidence of the inference to be made existed, the inference would 
not need to be made because the proof could simply be believed or dis-
believed. 
Whether a particular inference is made depends on the experiences 
of the person hearing the evidence or making the inference. The doubt 
based on the putative theft of the truck is a refusal to make an infer-
ence. The doubting juror may refuse to infer that the defendant drove 
the truck to the Murrah Building because the evidence, that defendant 
was seen with the truck on the day before the bombing and that defen-
dant did not report the truck stolen until after it had exploded, was in-
sufficient support for the inference that the defendant drove the truck 
to the Murrah Building. While one could argue that this is an unrea-
sonable doubt, the doubt would be better characterized as an unreason-
able refusal to infer.146 However, refusing to make an inference of 
145. At some point, a prosecution's case may be deemed insufficient to raise the infer-
ence of guilt. Preliminary hearings and grand juries may dispose of most of these cases, but if 
a defendant waives his rights to those safeguards and goes to trial, the prosecution may pres-
ent a case that, standing alone, is insufficient to remove reasonable doubt. Such a determina-
tion would likely be based on a common sense evaluation of the evidence suggesting that no 
reason to make an inference of guilt existed. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320 
{1979) {"Any evidence that is relevant-that has any tendency to make the existence of an 
element of a crime slightly more probable than it would be without the evidence, ... ---could 
be deemed a 'mere modicum.' But it could not seriously be argued that such a 'modicum' of 
evidence could by itself rationally support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
146. Conversely, a juror who willingly makes a possibly suspect inference may engage in 
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which a juror is not practically certain can hardly be considered unrea-
sonable. Indeed, refusing to make such an inference is very appropri-
ate. Again, applying subjective reasonable doubt can yield a conviction 
in a situation where applying objective reasonable doubt may not. 
Differences in opinion will always occur when jurors evaluate evi-
dence.147 As different experiences layer upon another, different people 
will analyze evidence in markedly different ways. Consider Rodney 
King's very real videotaped beating at the hands of Los Angeles po-
lice.148 The lessons that can be drawn from the beating are very differ-
ent. One could draw the lesson that Los Angeles police officers are 
willing to beat anyone who disobeys them or are willing to break the 
law to catch someone they believe to be guilty of a particular offense. 
Another person could draw the lesson that Los Angeles police officers 
are trained to deal with street confrontations with enough force to sub-
due the suspect. If people who draw these very different conclusions sat 
on the same jury, they would likely analyze differently a defendant's 
claim that his assault of a police officer was justified as self-defense af-
ter police allegedly beat him for refusing to consent voluntarily to a 
search. The juror who believes police officers will break the law to 
catch a suspect may reasonably believe that the police would beat a sus-
pect for refusing to consent to a search. More importantly, he may be-
lieve that based on slender evidence.149 Conversely, the juror who be-
lieves that police officers use only the force necessary to do their job 
subtle burden shifting. In making an unsupported inference, the juror suggests that defen-
dant must disprove the inference. While forcing a defendant to disprove an inference of guilt 
is proper when the evidence indicates no conclusion other than guilt, it may be improper 
when a reasonable possibility of innocence exists. The point where a juror justifiably shifts 
the burden to defendant to disprove the inference is the same point at which a reasonable 
doubt ostensibly becomes unreasonable. As a compromise, courts could require that reason-
able hypotheses of innocence have some tangible basis in the evidence presented rather than 
merely being created by the jury's mind. The process would be similar to treating reasonable 
hypotheses of innocence like affirmative defenses to be proven or at least be made plausible 
by the defense. See Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt 
Rule, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1665, 1668-77 (1987) (commenting on the shifting burden of proof re-
garding affirmative defenses in criminal cases). While this compromise may be reasonable, it 
may allow jurors to apply some level of proof lower than practical certainty. 
147. See supra note 131. 
148. The legal literature is full of references to various aspects of the King case. See, 
e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1995); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald, The Rodney King 
Videotape: Why The Case Was Not Black And White, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1637 (1993). 
149. How slender that evidence can be could be the focus of serious concern. See An-
drew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253, 321-23 (1996) 
(advocating use of special verdicts in certain situations in order to decrease the likelihood of 
acquittal based on impermissible theories). 
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may need much more evidence to convince them that a police officer 
would beat a suspect for refusing to consent to a search. Indeed, that 
juror may need a videotape to be convinced. Applying subjective rea-
sonable doubt over a jury provides a wide range of evidence evaluation. 
Different jurors will find different doubts reasonable.150 When all of 
those doubts are foreclosed, a defendant will be convicted. 
Differing modes of evidentiary analysis do not indicate the existence 
of improper or improperly exercised skepticism, 151 flawed thought proc-
esses or juror misconduct. If rational, differing modes of evidentiary 
analysis should be seen as wholly valid and appropriate.152 That eviden-
tiary analysis is idiosyncratic does not make it inappropriate. For in-
stance, that a particular individual might not believe uncorroborated 
testimony given by a police officer based on prior experience with un-
true uncorroborated police testimony is reasonable.153 Only when the 
individual disbelieves police testimony for literally no reason or relies 
on a reason that does not actually explain the disbelief should the ju-
ror's evidentiary analysis be deemed suspect.154 
150. See Rory K. Little, Guilt, Reasonable Doubt and the Reasonable Woman, 6 
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 275, 281 (1995) ("[I]f 'juror's minds' can differ, then so too may 
their perspectives. For all the anxiety about defining the level of certainty, our reasonable 
doubt instructions spend no energy at all on guiding twelve diverse jurors about perspec-
tive."); Moran, supra note 16, at 71 ("One person may have certitude that India exists be-
cause she has read about it in a book. Another person may read the book and not believe its 
existence with certitude until a close acquaintance has visited the place and returned to tell 
about it."). 
151. See Little, supra note 150, at 280 ("[D]oes reasonable doubt really mean 
'idiosyncratic doubt'-a doubt reasonable to a particular juror, perhaps, yet 'unreasonable' 
to the bulk of objective observers at large?"); Richard Cohen, The Fuhrman Tapes, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 17, 1995, at A29 (After explaining the Tuskegee experiment, in which the U.S. 
government left hundreds of black syphilitics untreated in order to study the effects of the 
disease, Cohen states: "The word 'paranoid' is sometimes applied to the black community 
but as Tuskegee shows, it is utterly without meaning. For African Americans, even the most 
unreasonable fears have been reasonable."). 
152. Indeed, if a reason for a twelve-member jury is to force a prosecutor to convince a 
cross-section of society, those with heightened or reasoned skepticism regarding various is-
sues should be jurors. Skeptical jurors may counterbalance overly deferential jurors. This 
should increase societal confidence in jury verdicts. Cf. Barbara A. Babcock, A Unanimous 
Jury is Fundamental to Our Democracy, 20 HARV. J. OF L. & PuB. POL'Y 469,472 (1997) 
("An important benefit of the unanimity requirement is that a group who must persuade 
those who see the world differently is more likely to deliberate and discuss the evidence 
thoroughly. This point is particularly relevant because we have just recently arrived at a time 
when white women and minorities are finally being summoned to jury service in significant 
numbers."). 
153. See Zuckerman, supra note 5, at 497 (noting that in the mid-1980s "English juries 
[had] shown a marked reluctance to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of policemen."). 
154. An individual who has an unarticulated reason for disbelieving the testimony may 
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However, changing times may change how jurors view evidence. 
That bizarre incidents continually impact our experiences may lead par-
ticular jurors to refuse to be practically certain unless some doubts now 
considered unreasonable are foreclosed by evidence presented. This is 
particularly worrisome.155 Experiences change our perceptions of truth. 
As the news of the absurd becomes more common, doubts that today 
appear unreasonable may actually be reasonable and soon become 
mainstream.156 As reports of strange occurrences increase, the likeli-
hood that our reasonable altema:~ve scenarios will become more un-
conventional increases. Over time, as new layers of experience and fact 
add to society's storehouse of experience, previously held truths may be 
discarded or altered.157 That may make either an objective or subjective 
reasonable doubt standard more difficult to overcome· over time. Inci-
dents that may have seemed odd in the past now appear to occur so fre-
quently as to seem commonplace.158 As a result, doubts previously 
deemed unreasonable may soon be deemed reasonable.159 At that point, 
not exhibit inappropriate skepticism. The inability to articulate the reason does not discount 
its reasonableness. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 16, at 68-69 (suggesting that inability to ar-
ticulate reasons for belief does not necessary mean the belief is irrational or incorrect). An-
tecedent issues that will affect verdicts need not be based on articulated reasons. Credibility 
determinations are quintessentially decisions that need not be based on articulated reasons. 
If reasons for a particularly important credibility determination were inarticulable, a verdict 
based on a credibility determination could be said to be based on something other than rea-
son. Cf. CARTER, supra note 21, at 223 ("What the foregoing analysis indicates is that the 
very question-fact or value-has meaning only in a particular epistemology that considers 
as factual only those propositions that are testable against the material world, and considers 
a proposition falsified when the evidence of the material world runs against it."). 
155. One United States Attorney has complained that jurors are beginning to demand 
evidence that has no reason to be co!Iected. See Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman, THE 
NEW YORKER, Feb. 24, 1997, at 64 (U.S. Attorney Eric Holder complaining: "We've got to 
the point now where police dust guns in situations where it doesn't make sense to dust, be-
cause one juror out of twelve will say, 'Well maybe it wasn't his gun."'). 
156. Before seeing the Rodney King beating video, consider how many people inside of 
the American majority would have believed Rodney King had he merely testified about the 
beating he received from the Los Angeles police officers. Would the people who believed 
King been labeled unreasonable for believing the police capable of such brutality and acting 
on such belief? 
157. Little reason remains to rely on information that has proven unreliable. See HUFF, 
supra note 23, at 87-92 (suggesting that the American justice system relies too heavily on 
witness identification evidence in the face of indications that it is often not accurate). 
158. Newspapers are littered with references to misconduct committed by those sworn 
to uphold the law. See, e.g., Kim Bell, Tape Allegedly Shows Abuse of Missouri Inmates, ST. 
LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 14, 1997, at A1 (reporting alleged brutalization of inmates 
during a prison search); N.Y. Police Officer Charged in Brutal Assault on Detainee, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 14, 1997, at A9 (reporting story regarding alleged sodomizing of suspect in cus-
tody). 
159. See Richard Cohen, supra note 151, at A29 ("Christopher A. Darden, a prosecutor 
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even a subjective reasonable doubt standard may become unadminis-
trable as it becomes less effective at identifying almost certainly guilty 
defendants.160 
Although subjective reasonable doubt is a high standard, it is not as 
high as practical certainty and cannot claim to provide results that are 
consistent with the application of practical certainty. Nonetheless, none 
of the foregoing analysis means that either of our hypothetical defen-
dants must or even should be acquitted.161 Rather, it suggests that prac-
tical certainty or objective reasonable doubt may be a higher standard 
of proof than the justice system can tolerate.162 Any reasonable doubt 
standard that does not conform to practical certainty risks allowing the 
conviction of defendants who have the reasonable possibility of being 
innocent, but the key question is how high a risk society is willing to 
take and how to manage that risk. 
The decision to imprison a citizen is a societal decision. Society has 
the right and duty to define guilt and the conditions under which defen-
dants will be incarcerated,163 subject to constitutionallimitation.164 Soci-
in the O.J. Simpson trial, summed it all up: 'You have to understand, I'm black. Nothing 
surprises me.' But me, I'm white, and I admit to both surprise and second thoughts of a kind. 
It just could turn out that the cop the defense called a racist perjurer is in fact a racist per-
jurer. You don't have to be white to be surprised by that but-as Darden suggests-it sure 
helps."). 
160. Conversely, others have suggested that the reasonable doubt standard has weak-
ened and might continue to do so. See George M. Dery III, The Atrophying of the Reason-
able Doubt Standard: The United States Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity in Victor v. Ne-
braska And its Implications in the Courtroom, 99 DICK. L. REV. 613, 615 (1995) ("despite its 
position at the core of our criminal justice system, the reasonable doubt standard has been 
severely weakened over the past quarter of a century"); see generally Note, Winship on 
Rough Waters, supra, note 65 (arguing that societal attitudes have lead to the implementa-
tion of various devices that have resulted in a functional lowering of the reasonable doubt 
standard). 
161. See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440 (1886) ("Persons of speculative minds may in 
almost every such case suggest possibilities of truth being different from that established by 
the most convincing proof. The jurors are not to be led away by such speculative notions as 
to such possibilities.''). 
162. Current conviction rates can be explained by juries that use the subjective reason-
able doubt standard because that is how they understand the standard. Conversely, some of 
the recent disenchantment with jury verdicts may be explained by jurors applying an objec-
tive reasonable doubt standard. 
163. Verdicts are not just a reckoning of the jury's opinion regarding the evidence; they 
are statements that a defendant has committed a crime and deserves to be punished. Cf. 
Nesson, Permissive Inferences, supra note 5, at 1194-95 (arguing that one key to the justice 
system is to have society defer to and respect verdicts regardless of the verdict's accuracy). 
164. The Constitution allows limited experimentation with state trial procedures. See 
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (allowing states to experiment with nonunanimous 
verdict). 
1998] REASONABLE CERTAINTY AND REASONABLE DOUBT 697 
ety seeks to punish the guilty and free the innocent through a justice 
system that functions to insure that society's goals are met. If particular 
procedures become impediments to successfully identifying and pun-
ishing the guilty, those procedures may be reinterpreted and restruc-
tured in order to allow the system to function properly. The functional 
formulation of reasonable doubt presented above flows directly from 
practical certainty and the presumption of innocence, and is the logical 
method for jurors to determine guilt. That formulation creates a test 
that may be too high to catch any reasonable number of actually guilty 
defendants.165 Objective reasonable doubt is the standard that guaran-
tees that jurors are as certain of a defendant's guilt as possible before 
convicting. Subjective reasonable doubt is the standard that is high 
enough for society to feel comfortable imprisoning another citizen. Part 
IV considers how society can address the differences between objective 
and subjective reasonable doubt. 
IV. HARNESSING REASONABLE DOUBT 
That the reasonable doubt standard can be explained in multiple 
equally legitimate ways is a part of the problem with how juries may 
apply the reasonable doubt standard.166 Commentators have attempted 
to provide comprehensive definitions of reasonable doubt/67 but none 
has been broadly accepted. Indeed, the reasonable doubt standard 
need not be defined for the jury.168 Consequently, each state and the 
165. Crime exists. The system's question is whether the defendant is the perpetrator. 
The standard of proof the system uses determines how many probably guilty defendants will 
be acquitted. 
166. Some commentators suggest that the reasonable doubt standard must be somewhat 
subjective since each juror must decide when she is convinced of defendant's guilt. See, e.g., 
Nesson, Permissive Inferences, supra note 5, at 1197 (suggesting first that the reasonable 
doubt standard must be individualistic because that gives most people a sense that the stan-
dard is the same as their standard and is fair and second that if reasonable doubt were quan-
tified, the fact that it would be at odds with many people's conception of reasonable doubt 
would render the standard objectionable). See also Fienberg and Schervish, supra, note 74, 
at 779 ("There is general agreement among commentators that the meaning of the 
[reasonable doubt] standard can vary with the crime as well as with other aspects of the trial, 
but there seems to be little discussion of whether the standard should be interpreted by all 
decisionmakers in each trial in exactly the same manner."). 
167. See, e.g., Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Instructing on Reasonable Doubt After Victor v. 
Nebraska: A Judge's Certain Thoughts on Certainty, 41 VILL. L. REv. 365, 427 (1996). 
168. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1984) ("[T]he Constitution neither prohibits 
trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of 
course."). Of course, not defining the term may leave the jury hopelessly confused regarding 
reasonable doubt. See Jessica Cohen, supra note 13, at 678, 693 n.128 (suggesting that an 
uninstructed jury may inadvertently raise or lower the standard for conviction); Dery, supra 
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federal system may independently define reasonable doubt and deter-
mine the conditions under which a defendant can be incarcerated. The 
lack of definition may leave juries to their own devices to determine 
how to apply the reasonable doubt standard. If a jury plausibly can get 
an accurate notion of the meaning of reasonable doubt, a conviction 
rendered by such a jury will be affirmed, barring other constitutional 
problems.169 This can lead to differing applications of the reasonable 
doubt standard. How the jury gleans what the law considers a reason-
able doubt is unclear,170 and no reason exists to expect jurors to apply 
any particular reasonable doubt standard with any regularity. Of 
course, this may not be problematic at all, since in many cases objective 
reasonable doubt would not be the favored standard.171 
Since the Supreme Court deems reasonable doubt easy to under-
note 160, at 629 (providing an uncomprehended standard as the definition of reasonable 
doubt may lead to "the government's burden ... be[ing] impermissibly lowered, raised, or 
substituted by a juror's own standards of certainty"); Smith, supra note 25, at 1818 nn.46-47 
(referring to studies suggesting that juries often do not understand reasonable doubt and the 
presumption of innocence); Diamond, supra note 40, at 1721 ("The term reasonable doubt 
cannot be understood by the Jay juror without further definition."). But see Note, Reason-
able Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, supra note 65, at 1955 ("This Note ... con-
cludes that courts should not attempt to define the term [reasonable doubt] in conveying the 
reasonable doubt concept to juries."). 
169. The jury may be left to its own devices or may be given instructions that only accu-
rately represent the flavor of reasonable doubt. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 ("taken as a whole, 
the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury") 
(quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (internal quotations omitted)). 
Of course, nothing suggests that a juror who believes he knows what a term means actually 
does. See Jessica Cohen, supra note 13, at 690 (suggesting that the fact that layman can 
fashion a definition for reasonable doubt without knowing what it means suggests that rea-
sonable doubt will be incorrectly defined); Diamond, supra note 40, at 1729 (suggesting that 
"refusal to define reasonable doubt upon request by the ... jury must be per se constitutional 
error" in part because a jury that does not understand the standard will not likely apply the 
correct one). 
170. Oddly enough, some commentators seem to believe that if jurors are not told what 
reasonable doubt means, the jurors will fashion a very good meaning for themselves. For this 
to be so, a jury's intuitive notion of reasonable doubt would have to be superior to a descrip-
tion provided by those trained in the Jaw. See Dery, supra note 160, at 618 ("Thus, the Su-
preme Court perceives the reasonable doubt standard as so basic that, in many cases, it may 
be read to Jay persons without any explanation. Yet, this same rule can suddenly become 
confused if defined by judges who are supposed to be expert in the Jaw."); see also, Newman, 
supra note 4, at 984 ("I find it rather unsettling that we are using a formulation that we be-
lieve will become Jess clear the more we explain it."). If this is the case, the jury's intuitive 
notion of reasonable doubt should be recorded and used for future jury instructions. Of 
course, it is possible that reasonable doubt may only exist on an intuitive level. See Little, 
supra note 150, at 278 ("[T]he concept of 'beyond a reasonable doubt' may be like a 'prime' 
number in mathematics: indivisible into Jesser components."). 
171. See supra Part II.B. and III.C. 
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stand, almost any reasonable doubt instruction that does not wildly mis-
state the standard may be deemed constitutionally sufficient for convic-
tion.172 Even instructions that may be easily misunderstood have been 
considered sufficient.173 The Court's willingness to uphold arguably con-
fusing reasonable doubt instructions seems problematic since it could 
lead to juror miscomprehension of the standard.174 However, the 
Court's focus on the juror's possible understanding, rather than prob-
able misunderstanding, of the instructions likely reflects the Court's be--
lief that jurors can recognize reasonable doubt when they see it. 
This context of little and possibly confusing guidance regarding the 
content of reasonable doubt allows jurors to choose subjective reason-
able doubt or objective reasonable doubt or any standard in between as 
their method for analyzing evidence and cases. At least two problems 
arise from this situation. First, different standards of proof may be ap-
plied to different defendants. Applying different levels of proof to dif-
ferent defendants effectively results in defendants being given different 
levels of justice. That is unacceptable. Second, jurors are allowed to 
172. Of course, the Court has invalidated instructions that have been found wanting. 
See, e.g., Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (invalidating instruction that "equated a 
reasonable doubt with a 'grave uncertainty' and an 'actual substantial doubt'"). Some com-
mentators have suggested that defining certain legal terms, including reasonable doubt, 
might lead to a loss of flexibility in their meaning. See Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. 
Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure To Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77,100 
(1988) ("[G]reater specificity might rob the law of its flexibility, its ability to evolve with 
changing times and changing community standards. Because of these problems, we would 
not propose a redefinition of the concepts to achieve greater clarity."). Whether society 
wants such terms to retain flexibility and whether community decision making should include 
decisions of rogue jurors remains to be seen. Interestingly, a student commentator suggests a 
flexible view of reasonable doubt should exist. See Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument 
Against Definition, supra note 65, at 1967-68 ("Leaving reasonable doubt undefined both 
avoids the pitfalls of attempting to define a term that defies precise definition, and harnesses 
the collective wisdom of the community as embodied in the jury to determine the appropri-
ate meaning of the term through deliberation."). The idea that reasonable doubt should 
change based on the community's definition suggests a ceding of power from the legislature 
that made the rules to a jury that applies the rules in both a micro and macro sense. See id. at 
1970-72 (suggesting that the decision regarding reasonable doubt should be a community de-
cision made by the jury as the community's representative in the judicial system). 
173. For example, in Victor v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court upheld instructions incor-
porating "moral certainty" because, when defined, moral certainty accurately describes the 
level of certitude a jury must have before rendering a guilty verdict. The Court did so while 
acknowledging that the definition of moral certainty could be unknown to many jurors. Vic-
tor, 511 U.S. at 12-15 (1984) (admitting that "moral certainty" may be an archaic term that 
may not be understood by jurors unless defined). 
174. Of course, how courts define the reasonable doubt standard may not matter. See 
Laufer, supra note 10, at 364-371 (suggesting that jurors often miscomprehend reasonable 
doubt and the presumption of innocence). 
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apply standards that may be higher than society desires for the criminal 
justice system. That may lead to the acquittal of defendants that society 
would have expected to and would have wanted to have been convicted. 
Either concern should be cause for alarm. 
In response to allowing juries to apply varying standards for reason-
able doubt, society should rethink the issue of what standard it wants to 
use to convict defendants. The problem is not necessarily with any 
standard between subjective and objective reasonable doubt. Rather 
the problem is that any standard could be fairly used to evaluate cases. 
The rethinking can move in at least three broad directions. First, rea-
sonable doubt could be redefined explicitly to mean practical certainty 
or objective reasonable doubt. Second, subjective reasonable doubt 
could be explicitly defined as the standard. Third, subjective reasonable 
doubt could remain the standard while courts continue to assert that 
practical or moral certainty is the standard. These three directions are 
not exhaustive, but they may be a start to the process of reconsidering 
how certain of guilt society wants juries to be before convicting defen-
dants. 
Redefining reasonable doubt as objective reasonable doubt or prac-
tical certainty has benefits and shortcomings. Ultimately, the justice 
system must serve its goals of convicting the clearly guilty and acquit-
ting the possibly innocent or it will cease to function. Although objec-
tive reasonable doubt nearly guarantees that very few innocent defen-
dants will ever be convicted, it also suggests that not many guilty 
defendants will be convicted. At some point, the risk of acquitting too 
many guilty defendants and leaving crime unpunished will overcome 
the risk of imprisoning innocent defendants.175 Society, not commenta-
tors, must decide how to evaluate those risks. Redefining reasonable 
doubt as objective reasonable doubt might be perfect, if criminal trials 
were the perfect vehicle for finding truth.176 However, because criminal 
trials are not perfect, that solution is not perfect. Ultimately, if society 
wanted objective reasonable doubt to be the standard of proof, it might 
have to restrict the conviction of defendants to cases in which the evi-
dence indicating guilt is airtight. It is unclear that society is willing to 
do that. 
175. See supra note 8. 
176. Redefining reasonable doubt as objective reasonable doubt might be the best solu-
tion in a perfect world where everyone could agree what a reasonable doubt is. Cf. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) ("[A] society that values the good name and freedom of 
every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reason-
able doubt about his guilt."). 
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Similarly, explicitly indicating that subjective reasonable doubt is 
generally the standard of proof and explicitly defining what makes a 
doubt reasonable is a difficult and possibly dangerous solution.177 Ex-
plicitly defining subjective reasonable doubt could subtly lower the bur-
den of proof. Such definition might require letting jurors know that 
they may convict defendants even if they know that a plausible possi-
bility exists that the defendant is innocent. How jurors interpret such a 
definition would be the most dangerous part of the proposal. Any sig-
nificant change or addition to the definition might yield a misinterpreta-
tion of how much doubt is allowed to exist when voting to convict. A 
significant misinterpretation could, in some case, change the reasonable 
doubt standard into one approaching a clear and convincing doubt 
standard. The effect of a redefinition would depend on how the rede-
fined standard was implemented. Generally, if the standard did not 
clearly lower the constitutional minimum for reasonable doubt, such 
experimentation might be allowed.178 
If the redefinition attempted to specify what doubt short of objec-
tive reasonable doubt an individual juror could have and still convict, 
significant problems could occur if jurors were prone to lower their 
standard of conviction even below subjective reasonable doubt. How-
ever, if the change were a structural one that merely eliminated a tradi-
tional element of reasonable doubt, the change might not have quite so 
bad an effect. For example, if the structural change were a widespread 
move to non-unanimous jury verdicts, the change might not be prob-
lematic at all from the Supreme Court's perspective.179 A change to 
non-unanimity would allow jurors to ignore the doubts, reasonable or 
unreasonable, of the most skeptical jurors on the panel. The result 
would allow jurors to ignore the possibly reasonable doubts that a small 
minority of jurors had. These doubts that would have yielded a possible 
acquittal or hung jury under a unanimous jury scheme would not stop a 
conviction if a substantial majority of jurors deemed those doubts un-
177. Cf. Jacobsohn, supra note 41, at 57 (considering the possibility that the reasonable 
doubt standard be lowered, but recognizing that the idea "is so foreign to Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tions of criminal justice that it is a political impossibility"). 
178. But see id. at 57 (suggesting that lowering the burden of proof would probably fall 
outside of the experimentation that the Supreme Court would allow). 
179. Arguably, the unanimity requirement is part and parcel of reasonable doubt. See, 
e.g. Osher, supra note 110, at 1339 ("Justice Story also believed that unanimity was an essen-
tial constitutional guarantee, reasoning that '[a] trial by jury is generally understood to 
mean ... a trial by a jury of twelve [men], impartially selected, who must unanimously concur 
in the guilt of the accused before a legal conviction can be had."') (citation omitted). Of 
course, the Supreme Court has disagreed. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
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reasonable. The belief that the doubts of a small minority probably are 
not the doubts that most in society would want to allow to stop a convic-
tion would probably underlie such a change. Unfortunately, any 
scheme that allows some reasonable doubts to be ignored may yield the 
conviction of some innocent defendants.180 As a standard of proof falls, 
the likelihood that innocent defendants will be convicted increases.181 
Given that reasonable doubt was meant to make certain that innocent 
defendants would be acquitted, a tacit lowering of the reasonable doubt 
standard seems at odds with historical norms.182 
Lastly, society could continue with the current system which touts 
objective reasonable doubt as the standard of proof while allowing and 
in some cases enforcing subjective reasonable doubt as the standard. 
Maintaining the status quo is somewhat problematic. The current sys-
tem could be said to suffer from the application of standards that are al-
ternately too high and not high enough. The result of this may be the 
acquittal of some defendants who should be convicted and the convic-
tion of some defendants who should be acquitted. Such a system may 
function properly on the macro level by convicting the correct propor-
tion of guilty defendants, but it may not function well on the micro level 
in that it produces a number of incorrect verdicts.183 
180. Inexplicably, members of the Supreme Court appear to disagree. See Johnson v. 
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 374 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) ("There is no reason to be-
lieve ... that a unanimous decision of 12 jurors is more likely to serve the high purpose of 
jury trial, or is entitled to greater respect in the community, than the same decision joined in 
by 10 members of a jury of 12."). The Supreme Court has stated that defendants should be 
content with nonunanimous verdicts. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411 (1972) ("In terms of this 
function we perceive no difference between juries required to act unanimously and those 
permitted to convict or acquit by votes of 10 to two or 11 to one. Requiring unanimity would 
obviously produce hung juries in some situations where non unanimous juries will convict or 
acquit. But in either case, the interest of the defendant in having the judgment of his peers 
interposed between himself and the officers of the State who prosecute and judge him is 
equally well served."). 
181. Increasing the pool of possibly innocent defendants who are convicted suggests 
that the number of innocent defendants who are convicted may rise. See Underwood, supra 
note 44, at 1333 ("No [burden of proof) rule can enable a fact finder with low power of dis-
crimination or little evidence to increase the chance of a true conviction without causing a 
proportional increase in the chance of a false conviction."). 
182 See Sundby, supra note 8, at 458 ("This deliberate imbalance [that the reasonable 
doubt standard creates] in favor of the defendant is a societal judgment that an individual's 
liberty interest transcends the state's interest in obtaining a criminal conviction[.]"). 
183. Recognizing that possibility of innocence may require shifting public resources to 
appeals that are based on factual innocence. This is a suggestion whose full analysis is be-
yond the scope of this article. A full analysis would require a full reexamination of habeas 
corpus procedures and other related appeal procedures. However, it is not sufficient for the 
system to act as though a guilty verdict eliminates all possibility of defendant's innocence. 
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However, the current system does have a few large benefits. First, 
the system is already accepted. Second, when subjective reasonable 
doubt is enforced over a unanimous jury that represents a cross-section 
of the citizenry, the effective standard of proof may begin to approach 
objective reasonable doubt without actually reaching it. A cross-section 
of jurors will likely yield a cross-section of reasonable doubts that must 
be overcome. When those doubts are aggregated, they may approach 
the doubts that would have to be foreclosed if objective reasonable 
doubt were required.184 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the wake of publicized trials whose verdicts did not seem to 
match widely held beliefs regarding the defendants' guilt, calls for jury 
reform have become loud and persistent.185 These calls almost certainly 
stem from the pu~ative reformers' belief that juries have rendered pal-
pably incorrect verdicts.186 However, how the reasonable doubt stan-
While the system may make few mistakes, the chance of mistake remains. Society must be 
vigilant to make sure that when mistakes are made, they are corrected through appeal when 
possible. 
184. The reasonable doubt standard and presumption of innocence guarantees that 
every juror who votes for guilt must have been presented with a strong case for guilt. The 
unanimity requirement assures that a strong case has been presented across a spectrum of 
views. The defendant must appear certainly guilty from twelve different perspectives and 
after twelve different applications of skepticism. Only when a defendant is so thoroughly 
proven guilty does a verdict reflect community consensus and is a verdict worthy of societal 
agreement. The unanimity requirement ensures that a broad range of skepticism is applied 
to the prosecution's case and that the verdict likely reflects what broad community consensus 
would be if the entire community actually sat in judgment of the defendant. Juries represent 
a cross-section of the community. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 378 (1972) 
(Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court has held that criminal defendants are entitled, as a 
matter of due process, to a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community. 
This is an essential element of a fair and impartial jury trial."). See also Mitchell Zuklie, 
Comment, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CAL. L. REv. 101, 107-09 
(1996) (detailing the doctrinal history of the cross-section requirement). Cf. Akhil Reed 
Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1188 (1995) 
(arguing that juries should contain at least twelve people so that the likelihood of a cross-
section of society sitting on the jury be maximized). 
185. See, e.g., Gerald F. Uelmen, Jury-Bashing and the O.J. Simpson Verdict, 20 HARV. 
J. OF LAW AND PUB. POL'Y 475,477 (1997) (detailing California's 'The Public Safety Pro-
tection Act of 1996,' an attempt to abolish the requirement of juror unanimity in all Califor-
nia criminal trials except capital trials); Osher, supra note 110 (detailing California's flirta-
tions with nonunanimous verdicts). 
186. At least many believe that recent verdicts have been unpopular with the general 
public. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS 16-17 (1996) ("[It is my 
intention to explain how, under our system of criminal justice, the Simpson jury could prop-
erly have reached a verdict so at odds with the conclusion reached by millions of intelligent 
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dard is defined or left undefined, rather than the jury system, may be 
the source of the perceived problem. The reasonable doubt rule and 
presumption of innocence reflect society's desires for the justice system 
and set the standard of proof necessary for conviction. Those require-
ments reflect two simple commands: Analyze evidence with a skeptical 
mind and be very sure that a defendant is guilty before convicting him. 
Those commands, when left unexplained or ill-defined, can cause 
confusion. Society would like to apply practical certainty or objective 
reasonable doubt in criminal cases to avoid the conviction of innocent 
defendants. However, subjective reasonable doubt is viewed as being a 
high enough standard for conviction because it requires that jurors be 
quite certain of a defendant's guilt before conviction. This reality re-
flects the tension between allowing the innocent to go free, but con-
victing some reasonable number of guilty defendants. If it does nothing 
else, hopefully, this article has served to indicate to society and the 
courts that tension exists between objective and subjective reasonable 
doubt. If society does recognize the difference in those standards of 
proof and at least alters our rhetoric to reflect that reality, this article 
has done enough. The time has come to face the difference between 
objective and subjective reasonable doubt. If subjective reasonable 
doubt is a sufficiently high level of proof, society needs to say that and 
accept any shortcomings that come with that level of proof. 
The jury is the conduit for societal goals. When society's goals are 
clear, the jury will function properly.187 If society wants practical cer-
tainty to be the required level of proof, juries can react by acquitting all 
but a few defendants. Similarly, if society wants to convict a reasonable 
number of defendants, it can use subjective reasonable doubt or any 
other level of proof that is constitutionally acceptable. The key is to de-
sign a system that is consistent and forces juries to provide the same 
level of justice for all defendants. 
and decent people who watched what they believed was the same trial."); Laura Gaston 
Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 325, 329-30 {1995) ("[T]he popular press, the entertainment media, and 
highly esteemed legal scholars have bemoaned the unpredictability and the 'irrational' be-
havior of juries."). 
187. See Kenneth S. Klein, Unpacking the Jury Box, 47 HASTINGS LJ. 1325, 1326 (1996) 
(suggesting that juries are as accurate as any other decisionmaker society may choose). 
